



CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY LAW FOR ETHIOPIA: LESSONS FROM 





After deregulation of consumer credit and resultant availability, over-indebtedness 
became a problem for many countries. As a response to this, many jurisdictions 
have departed from their “merchant-oriented” bankruptcy law to include 
consumers giving them discharge and fresh start. Germany, United States, United 
Kingdom and France are some of the countries that have adopted consumer 
bankruptcy laws after experiencing over-indebtedness problem. In Ethiopia, credit 
market is still highly regulated. Nevertheless, consumers have access to credit and 
are potentially exposed to risk of indebtedness and there is a move towards that. 
Adopting consumer bankruptcy law can also be an ex ante solution. More 
importantly, introducing such law to Ethiopia is more convincing based on the 
entrepreneurship, social insurance, development policy and rehabilitative function 
of discharge and fresh start. The author argues that Ethiopia should follow the 
global trend by adopting consumer bankruptcy law with adequate discharge and 
fresh start. This law should be based on German model, repayment plan and then 
discharge: repayment of certain portion of the debt and covering cost of 
proceeding by the debtor.  
_____________________ 
Keywords: bankruptcy, debt, discharge, exemption, fresh start, insolvency, 
merchant-oriented, over-indebtedness, rehabilitation, repayment  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Recent trends in bankruptcy show that many countries, industrialized or 
otherwise, have been introducing consumer bankruptcy law
1
 to solve the problem 
of consumer over-indebtedness and concomitant social and economic 
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1 Rafael Efrat, Global Trends in Personal Bankruptcy, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 81 (2002), at 81. 
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problems.
2
The previously “merchant-oriented” bankruptcy system is considered to 
be vital tool for consumers as well. Indebtedness ceased to be a problem of 
merchants and corporations only.
3
But with the deregulation of credit market and 
individuals’ access to consumer credit, over-indebtedness is becoming a problem 
for consumers, the society and the economy.
4
 Countries such as United Kingdom, 
United States, Germany and France adopted consumer bankruptcy laws as a 
reaction to availability of consumer credit and accompanying indebtedness. There 
are, however, countries like Ethiopia that still restricted their bankruptcy law to 
merchants only. Under Ethiopian law, only merchants are entitled to file for 
bankruptcy and non-traders are excluded from the scope of the law. That was 
based on the French approach
5
though France has departed from that philosophy 
and introduced bankruptcy for consumers in 1989.
6
 The reasons for such departure 
are almost universal and there is only a difference in the approaches with the 
solutions. It is, therefore, interesting to see if Ethiopia has to abandon its restriction 
and allow consumers to knock the door of courts for relief when they do not have a 
means to pay their debt. 
Accordingly, the article is organized as follows. Following this introduction 
part, Section II will deal with the historical development of consumer bankruptcy 
discharge and fresh start and its theoretical underpinnings. It mainly discusses the 
Anglo-American jurisprudence, the pioneer of bankruptcy discharge and fresh 
start, as a benchmark for the theoretical and philosophical underpinnings of 
consumer bankruptcy. History of discharge, justifications for it and associated 
costs to discharge and fresh start are discussed in this section. Section III is 
dedicated to deal with the comparative discussion of the United States and German 
consumer bankruptcy laws. The two leading countries with contrasting fresh start 
policy are chosen to see the strengths and weaknesses of each system with a view 
of finding a suitable fit for Ethiopia. Section IV is reserved to discuss the Ethiopian 
context and to examine the need to adopt consumer bankruptcy law to Ethiopia. 
The pros and cons of adopting consumer bankruptcy law and fresh start are 
 
2 Adam Feibelman, Consumer Bankruptcy as A Development Policy, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 63 
(2009), at 96. 
3
 JOHANNA NIEMI ET AL, CONSUMER CREDIT, DEBT AND BANKRUPTCY: COMPARATIVE AND 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, Hart Publishing, (2009), at 225.  
4 G. Stanley Joslin, The Philosophy In Bankruptcy: A Re-Examination, 17 U. FLA. L. REV. 189 
(1964-1965), at 189-191. 
5 Tadesse Lencho, Ethiopian Bankruptcy Law Commentary Part I, XXII: 2 J. ETH. L 57 (2008), at 
69. 
6 Robert Anderson et al, (ed.) Consumer Bankruptcy in Europe: Different Paths for Debtors and 
Creditors, 09 EUI Working Papers (2011), at 19.  
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discussed from the experience of the jurisdictions mentioned above. Finally, 
concluding remarks will be made under Section V. 
II. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY LAW 
A.  Historical Development of Consumer Bankruptcy Law 
In earlier times, indebtedness was a matter only for business entities and non-
traders were excluded from the ambit of bankruptcy law.
7
 Consumer debtors were 
subjected to barbarous punishments when they fail to repay their debt.
8
 These 
punishments include moral degradation of the debtor, physical punishment, 
relegation to the status of slavery, and even death penalty.
9
 Part of the reason for 
such treatment was that failure to repay a debt was considered as contrary to the 
moral dictates of the society.
10
 In many ancient jurisdictions, creditors were 
entitled to cruel and primitive self-help remedies against the defaulters’ person and 
property.
11
 Back in time, the today debtors’ heaven United States was not even 
different in this regard.
12
 
Bankruptcy law was dressed with criminal law type function and debtors were 
almost considered as criminals.
13
 The protection it sought to provide was towards 
the creditor.
14
 Creditors were allowed to individually, and not as a group, employ 
different self-help remedies, including “draconian punishments” against the person 
and property of the debtor.
15
 However, this was not helping the creditor since there 
were no effective ways of discovering and seizing the assets of the bankrupt who 
 
7 See G. Stanley Joslin, supra note 4, at 189; see also Nathalie Martin, Common Law Bankruptcy 
Systems: Similarities and Differences, 11 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 367 (2003), at 372-373; 
CHARLES J. TABB & RALPH BRUBAKER, BANKRUPTCY LAW PRINCIPLES, POLICIES AND PRACTICE, 
Anderson Publishing Co. (2003), at 479. 
8 Rafael Efrat, The Evolution of Bankruptcy Stigma, 7 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 365 (2006), at 367-
368 & 372 
9 Id., at 366;  
10 Id., at 367-368; See also John C. McCoid, II, The Origins of Voluntary Bankruptcy, 5 BANKR. 
DEV. J. 361 (1988), at 387; Ramsay, Iain D. C., Comparative Consumer Bankruptcy, U. ILL. L. REV., 
at 241 (2007), at 256, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=958190 (last 
visited on 28 March 2014). 
11 See Rafael Efrat, supra note 8, at370-374. 
12 Id., at 374-385. 
13 See Nathalie Martin, supra note 7, at 370; see also G. Stanley Joslin, supra note 4, at 192-193. 
14 See G. Stanley Joslin, supra note 4, at 190 
15 Id.; see also Rafael Efrat, supra note 8, at 366-368, 372; Nathalie Martin, supra note 7, at 371; 
Charles J. Tabb, The History of The Bankruptcy Laws in The United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. 
REV 5 (1995), at 7. 
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It was inevitable that the bankruptcy system had to be reformed. The severe 
treatments of the debtor had to be abandoned while giving creditors an effective 
debt collection and distribution tool.
17
 Factors that led to the reform of bankruptcy 
law into a debt collection tool were the expansion of credit, trade and commerce.
18
 
Around the end of 17
th
 century, individual debt collection mechanisms became 
inadequate to cope up with the development of commerce - distance traders have 
to travel - and the increase and diversity of creditors. In addition, the “race of 
diligence” among creditors over the assets of the debtor prompted this change. 
Race among creditors with the rule “first come first served” was inequitable and as 
a solution to the problem of race among creditors situated in the same footing
19
, a 
common debt collection mechanism needed to be created.
20
 This bankruptcy 
philosophy was not only protection of creditors against the debtors but also among 
creditors as well.
21
 Accordingly, bankruptcy was recognized as a debt-collection 
tool while, incidentally, the debtor started to be treated humanely.
22
 
In 1705, discharge as a legal doctrine was invented under English law
23
 and 
“honest but unfortunate debtors” started to be released against surrendering all 
their non-exempt assets in satisfaction of the full amount they owed creditors.
24
 For 
example, doctrine of discharge was incorporated in the law of England at the 
beginning of the eighteenth century.
25
 This change in bankruptcy philosophy was 
the result of industrial revolution that has created positive environment towards 
credit.
26
 This marked the shift of bankruptcy philosophy from treating failure to 
 
16 See G. Stanley Joslin, supra note 4, at 190. 
17 Id., at 191 
18 See Charles J. Tabb, supra note 15. 
19 See Michelle J. White, Why don't More Households File for Bankruptcy, 14 J. L. ECON, &ORG 
205 (1998), at 211. 
20 See Charles J. Tabb, The Historical Evolution of Bankruptcy Discharge, 65AM. BANKR. L. J 
325 (1991), at 328; see also Malhotra, Vibhooti, Debtor’s Discharge Under United States 
Bankruptcy Code: Mechanisms and Consequences (March 21, 2010), at 9, Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1646608 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1646608 (last visited 26 March 
2014). 
21 See Charles J. Tabb, supra note 15; see also Charles J. Tabb, supra note 20. 
22 See Charles J. Tabb, supra note20, at 333; see also Malhotra, Vibhooti, supra note 20, at 7. 
23 See CHARLES J. TABB & RALPH BRUBAKER, supra note7. 
24 See G. Stanley Joslin, supra note 4, at 191-192. 
25 See Charles J. Tabb, supra note15, at 10; see also Charles J. Tabb, supra note 20, at 333; see 
Malhotra Vibhooti, supra note 20, at 7. 
26 See Charles J. Tabb, supra note 15, at 12. 
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pay harshly towards a rehabilitation tool of the debtors.
27
 Punishing debtors or 
subjecting them to barbarous treatment proved to serve no one and this change was 
one of the most important developments in the history of bankruptcy law. The 
other development in bankruptcy law was the discovery of exemptions and 
discharge that revolutionized bankruptcy philosophy in the world and particularly 
in United States into one that sympathizes with the debtor than the earlier creditor-
oriented approach.
28
 This changed the philosophy and practice of United States 
bankruptcy law into rehabilitating and reorganizing tool than a punishment and 
liquidation instrument.  
Despite the negative attitude society had towards consumer bankruptcy, there 
is a trend towards adoption of consumer bankruptcy into laws of many countries.
29
 
The scope and protection afforded by these laws vary throughout history and 
across jurisdictions. It ranges from being totally creditor’s collective remedy to a 
‘debtors’ relief’ in the form of discharge and fresh start.
30
 So, it is conceivable to 
imagine rough variations from “no relief’ to ‘automatic debt relief’ jurisdictions.”
31
 
In some jurisdictions, either there is no access for individuals to opt for bankruptcy 
or no relief is going to be granted even if there is access.
32
 In jurisdictions where 
individuals have access, it may simply be a debt collection tool for the creditors 
and not intended to benefit the debtors in the form of discharge and fresh start. In 
other jurisdictions, consumers are entitled to discharge and fresh start as part of the 
bankruptcy process. Notable example where debt forgiveness and discharge is 
available is United States.
33
 
Hence, there is a trend towards convergence with regard to extending 
bankruptcy law to consumer though there still are significant differences in 
approaches.
34
 These disparities in the treatment of consumer debtors are attributed 
 
27 See G. Stanley Joslin, supra note 4, at 193; see also Paolo Di Martino, The Historical 
Evolution of Bankruptcy law in Italy, England and US, Paper presented at workshop at the Södertörns 
Högskola (Stockholm, August 2005), at 264; see also Margaret Howard, A Theory of discharge in 
consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 1047 (1987), at 1051-1052. 
28 See G. Stanley Joslin, supra note 4, at 194. 
29 See Rafael Efrat, supra note1. 
30 See John C. McCoid II, Discharge: The Most Important Development in Bankruptcy History, 
70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 163 (1996), at 164-165. 
31 See Rafael Efrat, supra note 1. 
32 Id., at 84. 
33 Id., at 87. 
34 For example United States and Germany both have consumer bankruptcy law. Debtors are 
entitled to file for bankruptcy. But the relief for bankrupt debtor is very different in the two countries. 
United States gives relaxed and automatic discharge while Germany the debtor has to wait and act in 
a particular way to earn the fresh start. For more explanation, see Section III below. 
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to several factors including but not limited to colonization,
35





 and differing policy emphasis for 
entrepreneurship.
38
 Worth to note at this point, however, is that countries that 
traditionally restrict their bankruptcy law to merchants are shifting towards 
allowing non-traders to be part of the bankruptcy process and benefit from 
discharge and fresh start.
39
 
B.  History of Discharge and Fresh Start in Bankruptcy 
Discharge and fresh start is at the heart of consumer bankruptcy.
40
 It is a 
release of the debtor of his pre-petition debts against full surrender of all his non-
exempt property to the creditors.
41
 This doctrine was invented in England and 
developed into a comprehensive legal doctrine in United States.
42
 The invention of 
discharge was one of the turning points in history of bankruptcy law that marked 
the shift from being only creditors’ remedy to that of debtors’ remedy. The first 
time discharge was invented in the Anglo-American jurisprudence was when it 
was first used under English law at the beginning of 18
th
 century. It was the time 
where “honest but unfortunate debtors” started to be released against giving their 
remaining property in satisfaction to their whole pre-petition debt.
43
 At first, it was 
not intended to benefit debtors and rather the impact was incidental.
44
 It was a kind 
of incentive for the debtor’s cooperation and hence it was purely a collection 
device.
45
 This first English discharge law was problematic in two ways.
46
 First, the 
scope was limited to that of merchant debtors and it was out of the reach of non-
 
35 See Rafael Efrat, supra note 1, at 91. 
36 Id., at 92. 
37 Id., at 96. 
38 Id,. at 98. 
39 Id., at 81 & 108; see also Lencho Tadesse, supra note 5, at 69-70. 
40 Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV., 
1393(1985), at 1393. 
41 See Charles J. Tabb, supra note 20, at 351; see also Douglas R., Bankruptcy Revision: 
Procedure and Process, 53 N.C.L. REV. 1197 (1974-1975), at 1200; see also DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET 
AL, BANKRUPTCY, PRACTITIONER TREATISE SERIES, West Publishing Co., (1992), at 12-13. 
42 See John M. Czarnetzky, The Individual and Failure: A Theory of Bankruptcy Discharge, 32 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 393 (2000), at 400. 
43 See Charles J. Tabb, supra note20, at 333. 
44 Id., see also Malhotra, Vibhooti, supra note 20, at7; Margaret Howard, supra note 27, at 1049. 
45 See Margaret Howard, supra note 27, at 1049; see also DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ELEMENTS OF 
BANKRUPTCY, The Foundation Press, (2010), at 37. 
46 See Charles J. Tabb, supra note 20, at 334. 
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traders. Second, voluntary bankruptcy was not put in place and it hampered the 
possibility of getting discharge.
47
 
The use of credit by individuals was a condemned act that remedy of 
forgiveness was not available.
48
 Rather, the use of credit and accompanying risk 
was accepted by the society and the remedy for failure was available for merchants 
only.
49
 Even for the merchants, the full utilization of the remedy was impacted by 
the fact that there existed only creditor-triggered bankruptcy, i.e., involuntary 
bankruptcy.
50
 The consent of the creditor was also necessary for discharge.
51
 This 
requirement was abolished later in 1883
52
 and replaced by courts’ discretion either 
to grant or deny discharge.
53
In addition, the application of discharge was not 
automatic and should be raised as a defense by the debtor when approached by the 
creditor seeking repayment.
54
 All these reveal that the then English law of 
discharge was intended to help creditors’ collection efforts and not to release the 
debtors as its objective. This, however, was an important development and shift 
from a barbarous treatment to a more humane view of the debtors. This move was 
followed by the recognition of consumer into the realm of bankruptcy in 1861 and 
voluntary bankruptcy for merchants.
55
 
The United States first bankruptcy Act, the 1800 Act, was not different from 
its English parent. Consumers were not recognized in the bankruptcy system; 
bankruptcy was involuntary, and discharge was not automatic as in English law.
56
  
Bankruptcy with debtor protection as its objective came only after the 1841 Act.
57
  
Though with creditors’ consent, voluntary bankruptcy was allowed for the first 
time and scope of bankruptcy was extended to non-traders.
58
 This pro-debtor 
attitude later resulted in different reforms that favored the debtor to a certain 
extent. Invoking discharge, as an affirmative defense by the debtor, was abolished 
 
47 Id., at 334-336. 
48 Id., at 335. 
49 Id., See G. Stanley Joslin, supra note 4, at 189. 
50 See Charles J. Tabb, supra note 20, at 336. 
51 Id., at 337 & 339. 
52 Id., at 354 & 357. 
53 Id., at 363. 
54 Id., at 340-343. 
55 See Charles J. Tabb, supra note 20, at 354. 
56 Id., at 345-346. As it was in English law, in order to benefit from discharge the debtor has to 
pay substantial percentage of the debt, get confirmation from the commissioners and finally the 
consent of the creditor. 
57 Id., at 349. 
58 See Charles J. Tabb, supra note 20, at 349-350, see also Charles J. Tabb, supra note 15, at 17. 
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and it became the duty of the creditor to file dissent.
59
 Another change was, 
although creditors’ consent for discharge remained in operation, the majority vote 
required in favor of consenting for discharge was reduced.
60
 The debtor was also 
granted right of appeal against denial of discharge for the first time.
61
 This right of 
appeal was the result of the availability of discharge to all persons - individuals and 
businesses and expanded grounds of denial of discharge.
62
 Subsequent amendment 
to the 1841 Act, i.e. the 1867 Act, made discharge very difficult to obtain because 
there existed several grounds of denial.
63
 
Creditors’ consent for discharge in United States was removed later in the 
1898 Bankruptcy Act.
64
 Unlike its English counterpart, the United States law did 
not give judges the discretion and denial as grant of discharge was statutorily 
fixed.
65
 This was an important departure from the long-existed bankruptcy 
jurisprudence, which had its prime focus of helping the creditor in his collection 
effort and incidentally benefiting the debtor by making discharge a relief for 
“honest but unfortunate debtors”.
66
 Here came ‘fresh start’ where “the debts of the 
debtor are wiped-out and he started life afresh as a productive member of the 
society.”
67
 The grounds of denial of discharge were reduced and only discharge 
was refused where the debtor committed crimes relating to bankruptcy.
68
 That was 
done to make “moral distinction between fraudulent and ‘honest but unfortunate’ 
debtors.”
69
 This pro-debtor policy was criticized as lax attitude and it became tight 
again and certain exceptions to it were provided.
70
 Part of the criticism was that 
 
59 See Charles J. Tabb, supra note 20, at 351-352. 
60 Id., at 352. In the 1800 ACT the requirement was that two-third vote in favor of discharge. But 
this was changed to simple majority, in number and value, in the 1841 Act.   
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 356-358.  No discharge will be granted or will not be valid if granted, when the debtor 
sworn falsely, concealing estate, cause/permit destruction of estate, destroyed, falsified or mutilated 
books and accounts, made fraudulent conveyance, payment or gift, etc.  
64 Id., at 364. 
65 Id., at 364. 
66 Id., at 364-365. 
67 Id., at 365. 
68 Id., at 366. 
69 See John M. Czarnetzky, supra note 42, at 425-426. 
70 See Charles J. Tabb, supra note 20, at 368. The exceptions were debts based on taxes, fraud, or 
obtaining property by false pretenses, willful and, malicious injuries, unscheduled claims and 
fiduciary misconduct 
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debtors were using the bankruptcy law as an escaping mechanism of their 
obligation while they could have paid their obligation out of their future income.
71
 
As it is discussed earlier under Section 1.1, the first use of proper bankruptcy 
law was a means of debt collection and equitable distribution among creditors.
72
 
Even discharge introduced at the earliest point of the invention of the concept was 
as a means of securing the cooperative hand of the debtor in the debt collection 
process
73
 and discharge was just a kind of incentive for that. Later in the 20
th
 
century, however, the philosophy in bankruptcy discharge was changed to a relief 
to “honest but unfortunate debtors”.
74
 This doctrine of discharge of debts of 
“honest but unfortunate debtor” was articulated in Local Loan Co. v. Hunt.
75
  
Accordingly, the debtor started to be released from pre-petition debts he incurred.  
Any asset acquired or income earned after bankruptcy petition could not be 
attached to the claims of the creditor. 
The choice of protection between creditor and debtor has passed through 





 century, the concept of bankruptcy was purely and simply a 
creditors’ vengeance-type remedy against debtors. Later, the harsh treatment of the 
debtor by the legal system and creditors proved to be unnecessary in the debt 
collection process and bankruptcy was devised to serve as a debt collection tool. 
Incidentally, the debtor started to be treated humanely. 
 At the end of 19
th 
century and beginning of 20
th
 century, debtor protection 
and relief became the corner stone of the consumer bankruptcy system.  
Accordingly, discharge became and is one of the means to give such protection.  
Further reforms to bankruptcy discharge and fresh start were motivated by the need 
to protect consumers who are overwhelmed by the availability and complexity of 
the credit market in particular and trade in general.
76
 This was justified on the idea 
of protecting the weaker party, which other social security systems failed to 
address adequately.
77
 In most cases, it is consequential that discharge and fresh 
 
71 See generally Irving A. Breitwoitz, New developments in Consumer Bankruptcy: Chapter 7 
Dismissal on the Basis of Substantial Abuse, 59 AM. BANKR. L.J. 327 (1985). 
72 Douglas R., The Bankruptcy Discharge: Towards A Fresher Start, 58 N.C. L. REV. 723 (1979-
1980), at 724 & 893; see also Douglas R, supra note 41, at 1200. 
73 Douglas R, supra note 72, at 724 & 893.  
74 Id. 
75 See Charles J. Tabb & Ralph Brubaker, supra note 7, at 479-80. 
76 See Vibhooti, supra note20, at 4; see also Douglas R, supra note 41, at 1202. 
77 See Douglas R, supra note 41, at 1202-1203. 
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start is available to individuals and not businesses.
78
 Discharge is not any more a 
debt collection mechanism. It is justified out of several reasons that are not 
necessarily protecting the creditor.  
C.  Justifications for Discharge and Fresh Start 
The philosophy of bankruptcy law that admitted individual debtors to its 
scope has to be backed by strong justifications. It is against State collection law 
that requires debtors to fulfill their obligations. Discharge is an exception to the 
conventional norm of repaying one’s debt. And as an exception, it needs 
overwhelming justifications.
79
 Different scholars have tried to provide answer for 
this problem. To this effect, they came up with justifications such as bankruptcy 
discharge as a debt-collection device,
80
 incentive of debtor cooperation in the debt 
collection process,
81







 debtors’ rehabilitation tool to keep him/her as a 
productive member of the society,
85
 relief for honest but unfortunate debtors,
86
 
societal act of forgiveness,
87
 correction of human weakness,
88
 reducing moral 
hazard in connection with lending
89
 and consumer protection,
90
 etc. But 
comprehensive legal research on the normative justifications on why discharge is 
 
78 See Vibhooti, supra note 20, at 7. 
79 See Margaret Howard, supra note 27, at 1047-1048. 
80 Douglas J Baird, A world Without Bankruptcy, 50 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.173 (1987), at 183-
184. 
81 See John M. Czarnetzky, supra note 42, at 395-96. 
82 See generally, Seung-Hyun Lee & Mike W. Peng, Bankruptcy Law and entrepreneurship 
Development: A Real Option Perspective, 32 ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW, 257(2007), 257-
272; see generally Wei Fan & Michelle J. White, Personal Bankruptcy and The Level of 
Entrepreneurial Activity, 46 J. L. & ECON. 545 (2003), at 545-567. 
83 See generally, Adam Feibelman, Defining the Social Insurance Function of Bankruptcy, 13 
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 129 (2005), at 129-186; see also Todd J Zywick, An Economic Analysis of 
consumer Bankruptcy Crisis, 99 NW. U. L. REV.1463 (2005), at 1473; See Douglas J Baird, supra 
note 83, at 175; see also Barry Adler et al,Regulating Consumer Bankruptcy: Theoretical Inquiry, 29 
J. LEGAL STUD.585 (2000), at 587. 
84 See generally, Adam Feibelman, supra note 2. 
85 See Douglas J Baird, supra  note 83, at 176; see also John M. Czarnetzky, supra note 42, at 
396; see Douglas R., supra note 72. 
86 See Todd J Zywick, supra note 83, at 1471. 
87 See John M. Czarnetzky, supra note 42, at 395-396. 
88 Id. 
89 See Barry Adler et al, supra note 83, at 608. 
90 See Ramsay, Iain D. C, supra note 10, at 262-263. 
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becoming an important part of consumer bankruptcy law is lacking.
91
 Most of the 
existing literatures reviewed in this article also confirm this fact. Despite the 
overwhelming effort scholars have dedicated, comprehensive normative 
justification is far from being achieved.
92
 Different scholars rather try to justify it 
from the perspectives they see it better justified.  
The above justifications are not features of consumer bankruptcy laws of 
every jurisdiction. In any legal system, one or a combination of some of them may 
be the justifications of the consumer bankruptcy system.
93
 The decision to adopt 
consumer bankruptcy differs across jurisdictions based on the socio-economic and 
political structures of a given country. The bottom line, however, is that many 
jurisdictions that restricted their bankruptcy to traders only are shifting their 
philosophy to include consumer bankruptcy and fresh start.
94
 This move has its 
backing from one or several of the above justifications. 
The next discussion is dedicated to the review of these theoretical 
justifications forwarded to back the need for discharge and fresh start in consumer 
bankruptcy. 
1. Entrepreneurial Analysis 
Consumer bankruptcy with discharge and fresh start has something to do with 
an entrepreneurship. One’s bankruptcy system shapes (is shaped) the (by) 
entrepreneurship culture of a given jurisdiction. Some scholars argue that 
discharge and fresh start increases the level of entrepreneurial activity.
95
  
According to them, access to credit coupled with availability of filing for discharge 
gives individuals an incentive to go for business.
96
 Individuals will be encouraged 
to take risks. The level of entrepreneurial activity will be good in jurisdictions 
where there is room for individuals in bankruptcy legislations and where the same 
provides for higher personal exemption levels.
97
 This is because, according to 
those scholars, consumer bankruptcy with discharge and fresh start gives 




91 See Thomas H. Jackson, supra note 40, at 1394; see also John M. Czarnetzky, supra note 42, at 
393. 
92 Id. Thomas H. Jackson, at 1394; John M. Czarnetzky, at 394. 
93 See Margaret Howard, supra note 27, at 1087-88. 
94 See Rafael Efrat, supra note 1, at 108-109. 
95 See generally Wei Fan & Michelle J. White, supra note 85. 
96 Id., at 547 & 552. 
97 Id., at 563. 
98 Id., at 547 & 552. 
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 It is a blunt fact that entrepreneurship and investing in new venture involves 
risk-taking. Stated otherwise, if investors are punished for failure too heavily, they 
will be hesitant to take risk.
99
 The risk may be exacerbated by the unlimited 
liability their unincorporated startup could bring if it is not successful.
100
 The 
market place should be convenient for learning from mistakes and that 
environment will help us get the best entrepreneurs.
101
 Individuals’ incentive to 
take such risk and foster their entrepreneurial activity can be motivated by 
generous discharge and fresh start. Studies show that pro-entrepreneurship 
jurisdictions have generous debt forgiveness while jurisdictions where investment 
and entrepreneurial activities are limited have tight bankruptcy rules with less or 
no discharge and fresh start.
102
 Fresh start has a direct positive impact on 
entrepreneurial activity.
103
 The availability of discharge and the time it will take to 
obtain discharge are very important in this regard.
104
 When generous discharge is 
available and it is automatic or can be obtained in a short time, it has good signal 
for entrepreneurs. The release of “honest but unfortunate debtors” will hurt 
creditors for sure, but the aggregate gains from entrepreneurship are higher than 
losses to the creditors.
105
 
The assertion that consumer bankruptcy with meaningful discharge is pro-
entrepreneurship is neither a well-recognized theory nor there is clear evidence of a 
bankruptcy system crafted based on the assertion.
106
 But empirical studies of 
consumer bankruptcy show that the ‘entrepreneurial analysis’ is consistent with the 
assertion.
107
 Of course, it is logical that when failure is not punished severely, there 
will be enthusiasms for entrepreneurship. There is, however, a legitimate concern 
that generous discharge may increase interest rates. Yet, studies show that fresh 
start encourages entrepreneurship.
108
 It is, therefore, quite possible for countries to 
 
99 John Armour & Douglas Cumming, Bankruptcy Law and Entrepreneurship, 10(2) AMERICAN 
LAW AND ECONOMICS REVIEW, 303-350 (2008), at 4; see also John M. Czarnetzky, supra note 42, at 
398-399. 
100 See Rafael Efrat, supra note 1, at 98-99. 
101 John M. Czarnetzky, Time, Uncertainty and The Law of Corporate Reorganizations, 67 
FORDHAM L.REV. 2939 (1999) as cited in John M. Czarnetzky, supra note 42, at 405. 
102 Rafael Efrat, supra note 1, at 98-99. 
103 John Armour and Douglas Cumming, supra note 102, at 6. 
104 Id., at 7. 
105 See John M. Czarnetzky, supra note 42, at 414. 
106 Id., at  448. 
107 Id., at 414. 
108 Frank M. Fossen, Personal Bankruptcy Law Wealth and Entrepreneurship-Theory and 
Evidence from the Introduction of “Fresh Start”, German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) 
(2011), at 28. 
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consider their bankruptcy law while dealing with their entrepreneurship policy. 
The more generous and predictable bankruptcy discharge is, the more 
entrepreneurship will be enhanced. Studies also show that bankruptcy discharge 
and fresh start stimulates self-employment.
109
 
2.  Social Insurance Function 
Consumer bankruptcy is also justified out of the social insurance function it 
provides.
110
 Proponents of this view see bankruptcy as a cure for capitalist state 
that has either abandoned or cut its welfare activities.
111
 Indebtedness is not 
voluntary and different circumstances contribute for failure to pay one's debt.
112
 
Losses of job, illness of the individual or his/her family, divorce, and business 
failures are some of the circumstances that will force someone into financial 
distress.
113
 The financial distress out of such changed circumstances is responsible 
for the increase in consumer bankruptcy cases in United States.
114
 Conventionally, 
such problems are dealt with under unemployment insurance, health insurance or 
other social assistance provided by the government based on the need. But the 
above insurances are private ones and may be unavailable because of market 
failure. In a system where social insurance is unavailable or otherwise inadequate, 
bankruptcy discharge can be a substitute.
115
 This, however, is not a complete 
substitute and is only applicable to certain cases such as for unsecured debt.
116
 A 
bankruptcy system that provides discharge and fresh start for unsecured debt can 
 
109 See John Armour and Douglas Cumming, supra note 102, at 18. 
110
 TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: 
AMERICANS IN DEBT 3-5 (2000) as cited in Admam Feibelman, supra note 86, at 130; see Todd J 
Zywick, supra note 83, at 1473; see also BARRY E. ADLER ET AL, BANKRUPTCY CASES, PROBLEMS 
AND MATERIALS, Foundation Press (2007), at 560. 
111 See Ramsay, Iain D. C., Individual Bankruptcy: Preliminary Findings on Socio-Legal 
Analysis, 37 OSGOODE HALL L. J.15 (1999), at 17. 
112 Id. at 22; see also Todd J Zywick supra note 83, at 1473. 
113 Id. Ramsay, Iain D. C at 22; Todd J Zywick, 1473; see also Robert Anderson et al (ed.) supra 
note 6, at 7.  
114 See Todd J Zywick, supra  note 83, at1473-1474: There are studies that show that medical 
costs are, partly, responsible for the rise in personal bankruptcy filings in United States. This is 
because United States has the weakest safety net programs for its citizens. In Europe where there are 
several safety net programs the bankruptcy filing rate is lower, significantly, to that of United States. 
For more information see generally, Sarah Emami, Consumer Over-indebtedness and Health care 
Costs: How to Approach the Question from a Global Perspective, (World Health Report 2010, A 
back Ground paper No-3), Available at 
http://www.who.int/healthsystems/topics/financing/healthreport/3BackgroundPaperMedBankruptcy.p
df?ua=1, (last visited on 12 March 2014). 
115 See Admam Feibelman, supra note 83, at 132. 
116 Id., at 141. 
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replace the social insurance function. This is the limitation of bankruptcy discharge 
unlike other social insurance tools. 
Studies show that bankruptcy system with adequate pre-petition discharge of 
debts can be justified out of social insurance (welfare) functions against some 
financial difficulties that may arise from loss of job, divorce, sickness, etc.
117
There 
appears to exist a direct relationship between the design of social insurances and 
bankruptcy system.
118
 The more generous the bankruptcy discharge is, the less 
social safety net programs are available and vice versa.
119
 The United States 
bankruptcy law fits into this formulation.
120
 The bankruptcy system is generous 
enough to allow troubled debtors to see their debt wiped-out against surrender of 
non-exempt assets; the social safety net programs are, however, less extensive.
121
 
The conclusion that can be drawn from the discussion made so far is that 
where welfare activities of the government are limited, individuals will opt to 
credit.
122
 This will expose individuals for financial troubles.
123
 This vulnerability is 
dealt with in some jurisdictions under their bankruptcy law that provides generous 
relief.
124
 Welfare states have less bankruptcy filings compared to states that do not 
have significant welfare programs.
125
Hence, the more welfare state a government 
is the less debt forgiveness available in the bankruptcy law and vice versa.  
3. Deregulation of Consumer Credit 
The availability of consumer credit is another reason for adopting consumer 
bankruptcy system
126
 with generous discharge and fresh start. There are evidences 
that countries have liberalized their discharge rules after deregulation of consumer 
credit.
127
 Access to consumer credit will make it possible for individuals to finance 
their own startups or pursue self-employment;
128
improve demand for products in 
 
117 Id., at 185-186; see also, Douglas R, supra note 41, at1203 as cited in Douglas R, supra note 
72, at 724. 
118 See Admam Feibelman, supra note 83, at 185-186. 
119 See Rafael Efrat, supra note 1, at 82-91 (2002) as cited in Admam Feibelman, supra note 83, 
at 184. 
120 Admam Feibelman, supra note 83, at142. 
121 See Rafael Efrat, supra note 1, at 82-91 (2002) as cited in Admam Feibelman, supra note 83, 
at 184. 
122 Id., at 102-104. 
123 Id., at 96-97. 
124 Id. 
125 Id., at 103-104. 
126 See G. Stanley Josling, supra note 4, at 189. 
127 See Rafael Efrat, supra note 1, at 92-93. 
128 See Adam Feibelman, supra note 2, at 66. 
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the market; smooth consumption across income gaps, reduces income shocks
129
 
and increases consumption of some “discretionary goods” (food, health care, 
education, transportation etc.), which can be considered as indicators of 
development.
130
But it will be a source for competition in consumer lending 
industry, which will expose individuals to huge risks and then to over-
indebtedness.
131
 These risks are dealt by those jurisdictions by adopting debt 
forgiveness provisions in their consumer bankruptcy rules.
132
 In jurisdictions 
where there is strict regulation of consumer credit, there is less relief from 
bankruptcy discharge.
133
 This is because individuals’ access to credit is very 
restricted and consequently exposed to less risk than in countries where consumer 
credit is easily accessible. 
4. Consumer Bankruptcy as a Development Policy 
There are also arguments that adoption of consumer bankruptcy with 
automatic discharge contributes to public development policy. They argue that, 
consumer bankruptcy will potentially create efficient consumer finance market 
while solving the problem of over-indebtedness.
134
 According to this line of 
argument, well-crafted consumer bankruptcy system benefits both creditor and 
debtor. The debtor will have an opportunity to finance businesses or ideas that are 
worth put into market. Creditors are also compensated for the consequences of 
discharge in the form of high interest rates.
135
 It will also solve the collective action 
problem, as it does in corporate bankruptcy, among creditors.
136
 Coordinated 
collective action among creditors will increase probability of getting paid.
137
On the 
contrary, race to the debtor’s assets, under non-bankruptcy law, may hurt the 
debtor and incapacitate his ability to earn in the future.
138
 So, consumer bankruptcy 





129 Id., at 66 & 75-76. 
130 Id., at 75. 
131 Id., at 66. 
132 See Rafael Efrat, supra note 1, at 92-93. 
133 Id., at 92-94. 
134 See Adam Feibelman, supra note 2, at 89-90, 104. 
135 Id., at 92. 
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5. Rehabilitating the Debtor 
Another most important justification for consumer bankruptcy and discharge 
is to keep the bankrupt individual as a productive member of the society.
140
 It is a 
rehabilitation and reintegration of an individual to the society. If the individual 
bankrupt is discharged from part or whole of his/her debt, he will have an incentive 
to earn income and own property in the future.
141
 The income is shielded, in whole 
or in part, from the reach of creditors
142
 and psychologically, the debtor will get 
relief from the distress out of the indebtedness.
143
That is a huge incentive to start 
life afresh as a productive member of the society.
144
 Therefore, treating debtors 
harshly because they failed to pay their debt will make things more complicated. 
Otherwise, the bankrupt individual may engage in different undesirable activities 
such as dependence on someone or engage in crimes that lead to social problems. 
6. Human Act of Forgiveness 
Bankruptcy discharge is also seen as a human act of forgiveness and 
rehabilitation of the debtor.
145
 This is what is called “humanistic view” of 
consumer bankruptcy.
146
 According to this view bankruptcy is a real problem 
affecting real people as opposed to people the neo-classical economists talking 
about. It rejects the hypothetical people and assumptions that economists use in 
order to understand the market.
147
 According to this view, real persons are not 
simply self-interested profit maximizers but they are also highly concerned about 
the wellbeing of others.
148
 “Humanistic view” of ‘fresh-start’ justification values 
people more than the money.
149
 This view takes ‘humanity’ as essential element in 
bankruptcy discharge policy and not simply an incidental element to be considered 
when pursuing another end.
150
 Accordingly, this view has its backing from biblical 
reasons than economic justifications. 
 
140 Id., at  92. 
141 See Margaret Howard, supra note 27, at 1062. 
142 See Adam Feibelman, supra note 2, at 92. 
143 See Rendleman, Douglas R, supra note 72, at 726. 
144 See John M. Czarnetzky, supra note 42, at 415. 
145 See generally Susan Block-Lieb, Book Review: A Humanistic Vision of Bankruptcy Law, 6 
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 471 (1998), at 471-493, reviewing “KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND 
FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM” (Yale University Press 1997). 
146 Id. 
147 Id., at 473 & 486-487. 
148 Id., at 473. 
149 Id., at 477. 
150 Id., at 477. 
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Another economic justification for “non-waivable” right to fresh-start is 
based on the theory of risk allocation.
151
 The idea is that one in a better position to 
avoid the risk should be able to bear it.
152
 Accordingly, the law has to choose one 
victim out of two innocents and it has to be the creditor. But this justification does 
not escape from criticism because, according to some scholars, it is not possible to 
identify with certainty the superior risk bearer.
153
 
The discussion made so far shows some of the socio-economic and political 
justifications forwarded to back why doctrine of discharge in consumer bankruptcy 
law is becoming an important policy tool. A consumer bankruptcy regime in any 
jurisdiction will have its theoretical underpinning in one or more of the 
justifications discussed above. These justifications are benefits of well-crafted 
consumer bankruptcy law. However, there are costs consumer bankruptcy will 
bring to different stakeholders such as the creditor, the state and the community. 
The following section is dedicated to point out those pitfalls the doctrine of 
discharge in consumer bankruptcy law. 
D. Costs of Consumer Bankruptcy 
There is no doubt that the debtor will be better off when his debt is wiped-out 
by discharge and started his/her life afresh. It is true that credit will help the debtor 
finance his/her affairs (such as buying house, pay for school, etc.) or overcome 
temporary economic troubles that will make the individual life miserable. When an 
individual lost job, incurred significant bill due to his/her sickness or that of a 
family member, divorced and has to rent new house, new tools, etc., getting credit 
will help a lot. The problem will come later when the debtor is unable to pay back 
what he owed to creditors.  
Consumer bankruptcy provides a solution. It provides a mechanism by which 
all the non-exempted assets, such as expensive musical instruments unless the 
debtor is a musician, collections of stamps, coins, and other valuable items, family 
heirlooms, cash, bank accounts, stocks, bonds, a second car, second home, etc.,of 
the debtor will be liquidated and paid to the creditors and the debtor will be set free 
and starts life afresh. So it serves both the debtor and the creditor. The debtor will 
be freed of his pre-bankruptcy obligations and creditors will be treated equitably 
avoiding the problem of race among themselves. 
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But there are certain costs the creditor, the society and the state have to bear. 
And this is the “bitter-sweet paradox” of consumer bankruptcy. The release of the 
debtor comes at a huge cost to those stakeholders. The first criticism of consumer 
bankruptcy is that creditors’ return is exposed to the risk of discharge.
154
 Generous 
consumer bankruptcy law that releases debtors from their obligation will hurt 
creditors. In consumer bankruptcy, creditors, more likely, will see the debtor walk-
off without paying a penny. This will also affect the institution of contract and 
principle of freedom of contract. Bankruptcy as a ‘debt collection tool’ is not true, 
at least in most cases, because consumer debtors usually do not have assets 
left.
155
Studies show that most of the consumer bankruptcies in the United States 
are based on Chapter 7
156
 and the same do not distribute any asset to unsecured 
creditors.
157
 It is also true in Germany that most plans do not pay creditors and 
debtors are seen walk-off free.
158
 Moreover, discharge policy is not intended to 
solve the creditors’ collection problem.
159
 It is intended for the debtor and debtor 
only. This will hurt creditors by reducing their return. 
The availability of generous discharge in consumer bankruptcy also makes 
credit very expensive for debtors. The creditors will increase the premium charging 
high interest rates for the credit they provide.
160
 There will be reaction from 
lenders in the form of increasing the rate of interest to offset the losses because 
there is less chance of repayment.
161
 This will affect the credit market by making 
credit expensive or limiting its availability.
162
 There will also be direct cost on the 
particular individual debtor whose access to credit will be limited or just come at 
 
154 See Adam Feibelman, supra note 2, at 68. 
155 See Richard M. Hynes, Why (Consumer) Bankruptcy? 56 ALA. L. REV. 121 (2004/5),at 123. 
156 See Michelle J. White, Why It Pays to File for Bankruptcy: A Critical Look at the Incentives 
Under U.S. Personal Bankruptcy Law and a Proposal for Change, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 685 (1998), at 
688. 
157 See Richard M. Hynes, supra note 155, at 123 & 129. 
158 Jason J. Kilborn, The Innovative German Approach to Consumer Debt Relief: Revolutionary 
Changes in German Law, and Surprising Lessons for the United States, 24 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 
257 (2003/4), at 278-79; see also JOHANNA NIEMI ET AL, supra note 3,at 336. 
159
 THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW, Beard Books (2001), at 
225. 
160 Michelle J. White, Economic Analysis of Corporate and Personal Bankruptcy, (NBER 
Working Paper Series, at 64), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w11536.pdf(last visited on 29 
March 2014); see Adam Feibleman, supra note 2, at 92; Adam Feibelman, supra note 83, at 171. 
161 See Frank M. Fossen, supra note 112, at 28. 
162 See Michelle J. White, supra note 164; see Adam Feibelman, supra note 83, at171. 
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high cost.
163
 But it can be argued against it in that the debtor who has no creditors 
anymore because of discharge can find it easy to get credit.
164
 There are also other 
costs on the individual bankrupt debtor. In order to get discharge he has to give up 
all his non-exempt assets to the creditor. The creditor and the debtor may value 
such assets differently and when it means so much for the debtor than the creditor 
then that is the cost the debtor has to bear.
165
 
The other concern is that the failure of debtors to repay their debt will hurt 
financial markets. There are studies, however, that show on comparison the 
benefits of discharge outweigh the costs of making entrepreneurial activity 
smooth.
166
 Social Insurance benefits of consumer bankruptcy also outweigh the 
costs of increased interest rates.
167
 Two other problems associated with the 
insurance analogy of consumer bankruptcy are moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems.
168
 According to this view, knowing that s/he will file for bankruptcy 
discharge, individuals may be reckless in loan and spending decisions. And the 
customers of this insurance are those who are most likely to fail to repay; adverse 
selection problem.
169
 But the reputation and stigma associated with being bankrupt 
will work against the moral hazard problem.
170
 That means even with discharge 
and fresh start; individuals will lose so much when they go bankrupt.
171
Reputation, 
the inconvenience of getting registered as bankrupt and inability to get further 
loans, etc., will work as a counter-incentive against moral hazard. 
There is also a criticism that consumer bankruptcy hurts the state and 
community. To the government, financing of the system is a huge burden. It wastes 
the taxpayers’ money for the fault and financial mismanagement and or 
misfortunes of individuals. In addition, the administration of bankruptcy 
proceedings will cost the state when the individual is unable to cover the costs. 
 
163 See Michelle J. White, supra note 19, at 211; see Michelle J. White, supra note 156, at 691; 
see Thomas H. Jackson, supra note 40, at 1426-1427; see BARRY E. ADLER ET AL, supra note 110, 
at560. 
164 See BARRY E. ADLER ET AL, supra note 110. 
165 See Thomas H. Jackson, supra note 40, at 1427. 
166 See Frank M. Fossen, supra note 112.  
167 Id. 
168 See BARRY E. ADLER ET AL, supra note 110. 
169 Id. 
170 Id., at 561. 
171 Id. 
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Stigma is another cost the bankrupt individual has to bear
172
 while using 
consumer bankruptcy. Even in United States, failure to pay one’s debt is still seen 




III. CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY LAWS IN UNITED STATES AND GERMANY 
In this section the laws and experiences of United States and Germany will be 
discussed. The comparative discussion of the two systems is justified out of the 
following reasons. Firstly, the two leading countries with contrasting fresh start 
policy are chosen to see the strengths and weaknesses of each system with a view 
of finding a suitable fit for Ethiopia. Secondly, these countries’ laws have been 
also major legal exports to different countries in the world. 
A. Consumer Bankruptcy Law in United States 
In United States individual debtors have two options while considering filing 
for consumer bankruptcy: Chapter 7 or Chapter 13.
174
 The most important benefit 
associated with consumer bankruptcy, under both chapters, is the benefit of 
discharge and thereby fresh start.
175
 Unless the debtor committed any of criminal 
acts of bankruptcy (fraud, concealment etc.), the debtor, as a rule, will be released 
of his obligation to repay.
176
 Under Chapter 7 the debtor has to surrender all assets 
in excess of the relevant exemption level; the trustee liquidates the assets, pay the 
creditors and debtor walk-off.
177
 No creditor can ask for repayment from the debtor 
after bankruptcy. There will also be benefit of automatic stay soon after the debtor 
petitioned for bankruptcy. Consumer bankruptcy under Chapter 7 is counterpart to 
that of business liquidation, also known as straight bankruptcy. 
 
172 See Michelle J. White, supra note 156, at 691. 
173 See BARRY E. ADLER ET AL, supra note 110. 
174 See Robert H. Scott, III, Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005: 
How the credit Card Industry’s Preservance paid off, 41 J.ECON. ISSUES, 943 (2007) at 944; see 
Elijah M. Alper, Opportunistic Informal Bankruptcy: How BAPCPA May Fail to Make Wealthy 
Debtors Pay Up, 107 COLUM. L. REV.1908 (2007), at 1913. 
175 See THOMAS H. JACKSON, supra note 159; see Carl Felsenfeld, Denial of discharge for 
Substantial abuse: refining-Not Changing Bankruptcy law, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1369 (1999), at 
1369-1370. 
176 THOMAS H. JACKSON, supra note 159. 
177 See Robert H. Scott, III, supra note 174. 
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Chapter 13 is about adjustment of debts of an individual with regular 
income.
178
 The debtor will put a plan to the creditors based on what s/he earns and 
the amount s/he need for living. The debtor will pay creditors according to the plan 
out of the disposable income for a certain period of time (3-5 years); then, he will 
be discharged.
179
 And this is counterpart to that of reorganization in business 
bankruptcy. Goal of chapter 13 is, hence, rehabilitation of the debtor. Chapter 7 
has advantages over chapter 13 and vice versa. Under chapter 7 there is an 
immediate discharge and the procedure is somehow simple.
180
 Chapter 13 requires 
the debtor to come up with a plan and the debtor has to perform his repayment 
obligation for a certain period of time.
181
 Discharge will come after the plan is 
executed. Chapter 13 will allow the debtor to keep his/her assets while under 
Chapter 7 such options are not available. Despite this, however, most of the 
consumer bankruptcy cases are based on chapter 7.
182
 
The philosophy of the United States consumer bankruptcy law is very clear: 
no one should be put in jail for failure to pay his/her debt unless involved in 
bankruptcy crimes. Debtors who are not using the system to escape repayment 
duties will be given fresh start. Accordingly “honest but unfortunate debtors” will 
be released from part or whole of their debt. The two chapters are designed 
accordingly and will be discussed in detail in the following section. 
1. Chapter 7 
Chapter 7 governs the process of liquidation of the debtors’ assets, individual 
or business, under the United States Bankruptcy Code.
183
 The debtor will give up 
all his non-exempt assets in exchange for discharge.
184
 This is “non-waiveable” 
right for every individual. When filing under Chapter 7, there are two important 
concepts. The first is automatic stay, which stops any action of the creditor against 
 
178 See Michelle J. White, supra note 19, at 210; see David G. Epstein et al, supra note 41, at 13; 
see Mi chelle J. White, supra note 691. 
179 See Robert H. Scott, III, supra note 174. 
180 See Elijah M. Alper,supra note 174, at 1914. 
181 See Richard H.W. Maloy, "She'll Be Able to Keep Her Home Won't She?"- The Plight of a 
Homeowner in Bankruptcy, MICH. ST. DCL L. Rev. 315 (2003), at 339-40, as cited in Elijah M. 
Alper, supra note 174, at 1914. 
182 See Richard M. Hynes, Why (Consumer) Bankruptcy?, 56 ALA. L. REV 121, 127 n.32 (2004), 
as cited in Elijah M. Alper, supra note 178, at 1914. 
183
 11 UNITED STATES CODE BANKRUPTCY, (hereinafter, Bankruptcy Code), available at, 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/11/chapter-7/subchapter-II (last visited on 16 March 2014). 
184 See generally Michelle J. White, supra note 19, at 205-231; see BARRY ADLER ET AL, supra 
note 83; See Michelle J. White, supra note 156, at 687. 
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the debtor, judicial or extra-judicial.
185
 This is temporary order, pending the final 
decision of the court, which protects the debtor from harassment. The second 
important concept under Chapter 7 filing is discharge.
186
 The exempt assets and 
future income of the debtor and human capital are shielded from the demand of the 
creditors.
187
 Only debts incurred before the order of relief are subjected to 
discharge.
188
 The individual is not required to give the exempt assets or pay debt 
out of his future income. Creditor is prohibited from pursuing collection efforts 
once discharge is granted to the debtor.
189
 But that is restricted to the individual’s 
pre-bankruptcy life and not future debts/obligations.  
In order to be eligible for a Chapter 7 discharge there are certain conditions 
that should be fulfilled. The first condition is that only individual debtors are 
entitled for ‘Chapter 7 discharge’.
190
 Chapter 7 filing is available for both 
businesses and individuals but ‘discharge’ is available only for individuals. 
Second, the debtor should not commit fraudulent acts such as mutilate, conceal or 
transfer assets within one year of filing or property of the estate after filing.
191
 To 
benefit from discharge, the debtor has to disclose the whereabouts of all his assets 
and turn them over to the creditors’ consideration.
192
 This will make sure that no 
property is hidden from the creditors
193
 and this builds the integrity of the 
bankruptcy system. Third, unjustified failure by the debtor to keep accounts and 
record will bar the right to discharge.
194
 These include conceal, falsify or destroy 
documents, engage in any fraudulent act on accounts etc
195
and commission of 
bankruptcy crimes.
196
 Finally, debtor should not have received bankruptcy 
discharge under chapter 7 within eight years.
197
 If the debtor was discharged under 
Chapter 12 or Chapter 13, he has to wait for six years to file for Chapter 7 
 
185 See Richard M. Hynes, supra note 155, at 129. 
186 Id. 
187 See Michelle J. White, supra note 19, at 205; See BARRY ADLER ET AL, supra note 83,at 587; 
see Thomas H. Jackson, supra note 40, at 1396-97; BARRY E. ADLER ET AL, supra note 110, at 559. 
188 See CHARLES J. TABB & RALPH BRUBAKER, supra note 7, at 482. 
189 See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, supra note 45, at 44. 
190 See CHARLES J. TABB & RALPH BRUBAKER, supra note 7, at 500. 
191 Id.; see also 11 U. S. C. -Bankruptcy, supra note 183, § 727. 
192 See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, supra note 45, at 31. 
193 Id., at 35. 
194 See CHARLES J. TABB & RALPH BRUBAKER, supra note 7, at 500; the Bankruptcy Code, § 727. 
195 See THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, § 727. 
196 See CHARLES J. TABB & RALPH BRUBAKER, supra note 7, at 500. 
197 See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, supra note 45, p. 37; THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, § 727 (a) (8). 
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discharge.
198
 But this condition does not apply if the debtor files the second case 
for discharge based on chapter 12 or 13.
199
 
Moreover, not all debts are dischargeable.
200
 There are certain debts that are 
‘non-dischargeable’
201
 by their nature and the individual whose debt has been 
discharged is still obliged to pay non-dischargeable debts.
202
 These ‘non-
dischargeable’ debts include taxes and custom duties, those debts obtained by false 
representations or fraud, domestic support obligations, tort claims, etc. These 
exceptions fall into two categories
203
 and the rational for ‘excepting’ them is 
justified out of public policy considerations.
204
 Most often these debts are obtained 
by ‘wrongful’ act of the debtor or they are very ‘essential’ for the creditor.
205
 In the 
first category, “there is either a ‘moral turpitude’ or intentional wrongdoing on the 
part of the debtor”.
206
 And no sensible legal system is willing to bless a debtor who 
acted with such moral and intent with discharge. Reprehensible and malicious 
conducts of the debtor need to be discouraged by the denial.
207
 In the second 
category, the repayment of the debt, no matter how difficult it will be, is very 
essential for the creditor. Hence, it is in the interest of the general public that these 
debts are ‘excepted’ from discharge.
208
 And creditors are allowed to ask repayment 
of these non-dischargeable debts, even, after bankruptcy.  
Apart from these two exceptions, it is also possible that the debtor may not be 
given discharge of certain debts. It is a condition precedent that the debtor has to 
list out all creditors while filing for bankruptcy.
209
 If s/he failed to do that a 
 
198 See the Bankruptcy Code, supra note 183, § 727(a) (9)  
199 See CHARLES J. TABB & RALPH BRUBAKER, supra note 7, at 500. 
200 See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, supra note 45, at 46. 
201 See THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, supra note 183, § 523. 
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Objections To Discharge;http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/report/07consum.html last visited on 8th 
March 14 
205 See CHARLES J. TABB & RALPH BRUBAKER, supra note 7, at 511. 
206 See infra note 208. 
207 See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, supra note 45, at 48. 
208 These includes unscheduled debts, certain taxes, debts for spousal or child support, debts to 
government, student loans, debts for personal injury caused by the debtor’s operation of a motor 
vehicle while intoxicated etc. 
209 See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, supra note 45, at 46. 
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creditor who is not notified of the proceeding and did not share in the assets will 
not see his claim discharged.
210
 
Fresh start from Chapter 7 discharge in United States has two sources.
211
 The 
first source is from section 727 of the Bankruptcy Code.
212
 It states that the 
individual debtor who gives up his/her assets will be discharged and creditors 
cannot encroach into future income or assets of that debtor.
213
 The second source 
for fresh start is section 522 plus state and federal non-bankruptcy laws.
214
 These 
second sources allow the individual certain level of exempted property.
215
Hence, 
future income and exempted property constitute fresh start.
216
 Care must be taken, 
however, that policy of consumer bankruptcy law is financial fresh start for the 
debt-troubled individual shielding the future income (fruits of labor) and not to 
protect his/her wealth.
217
 Exemption is an exception to the creditors’ right to the 
assets of the individual debtor. Issue of exemption is left for states and this also can 
show that it is not the core policy of United States bankruptcy law.
218
 
The consumer bankruptcy under Chapter 7 gives financially troubled 
individuals a fresh start by shielding the exempt assets and future income of the 
individuals. It is insurance for the debtor who otherwise does not have viable 
options to pass through difficult times (loss of job, illness etc.). The debtor being 
required to be honest in disclosing and giving up his assets to the creditors’ 
questioning, bankruptcy rules are designed to release the “honest but unfortunate 
debtor” from yoke of debt s/he incurred and cannot repay.  
There are also problems associated with consumer bankruptcy. The discharge 
available will inevitably create ground for dishonest debtors to abuse the system. 
To tackle such abuse the United States bankruptcy law provides certain rules to 
make sure of the integrity of the system. The system starts by making some debts 
non-dischargeable.
219
 When the debtor acted out of “moral turpitude” then 
discharge is denied. When the debtor acted fraudulently and transfers or conceals a 
 
210 Id. 






217 See THOMAS H. JACKSON, supra note 159, at 254-255. 
218 Id. 
219 See § 523 of THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, supra note 183. 
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property s/he cannot obtain discharge.
220
 Additionally, there is a limitation of time 
within before the lapse of which the debtor cannot go for another petition under 
chapter 7. If s/he has to file for a chapter 7 case again, s/he has to wait for eight 
years period.
221
 Of course, it works to the debtors’ favor as well. It will be easy for 
the debtor to get credit but creditors can also chase the debtor for payment before 
he can file for bankruptcy.
222
 
There are also rules that prevent the debtor from abusing the system as a tactic 
to delay creditor’s collection efforts.
223
 The debtor, once s/he files for bankruptcy, 
has to provide all the necessary information or risk dismissal of her/his case.
224
 
There is doubt on this rule that it may work in favor of the debtor who wanted to 
avoid bankruptcy against creditors will by failing to provide the information 
required.
225
 But the writer thinks, in consumer bankruptcy case, especially Chapter 
7, that where the creditor is not usually paid, there is no incentive for the debtor to 
go that way and does not have potential harm to the creditor. 
The debtor education and credit counseling introduced under the 2005 
Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection Act
226
 is also another way to keep the 
integrity of the bankruptcy system. All individual debtors, no matter which chapter 
they use, have to take credit counseling and debtor education before and after filing 
bankruptcy respectively. It is compulsory requirement
227
 to qualify as a debtor 
within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code. The credit-counseling course should 
be taken 180 days before filing for bankruptcy.
228
The course will help the debtor in 
organizing a plan of payment even without filing for bankruptcy if the creditors 
agree.
229
 Failure to take this counseling will result in the dismissal of the 
bankruptcy case. On the other hands, the debtor education course required after the 
filing of bankruptcy is to help the debtor manage his financial affairs in the future. 
It is to equip the debtor with personal financial management skills. 
 
220 See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, supra note 45, at37. 
221 Id., see THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, supra note 183, § 727 (a) (8). 
222 See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, supra note 45, at 37. 
223 Id. 
224 Id., at 37-38; see THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, supra note 183, § 521 (i). 
225 See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, supra note 45, at 37. 
226 Joseph Satorius, Strike or Dismiss: Interpretation of the BAPCPA 109(h) Credit Counseling 
Requirement, 75 FORDHAM L.REV. 2231(2007),at 2233-2234. 
227 See THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, supra note 183, § 109 (h) (1). There are exceptions to these 
requirements as provided under 109 (h) (2); see generally, Joseph Satorius, supra note 226, at 2234. 
228 See Joseph Satorius, supra note 226, at 2234.  
229 See Robert H. Scott, III, supra note 174, at946. 
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The bankruptcy code has also designed a mechanism to tackle abuse of 
Chapter 7 filing. The problem with this chapter is that consumer debtors, in most 
cases, walk-off without paying even though they have a means to pay part of their 
debt.
230
 Ronald claims that “There was a concern that consumer are using the 
bankruptcy system as a means of financial planning than as a relief when they 
honestly fail to repay their debt.”
231
 In response to this, section 707 (b) was added 
to the 1984 amendments of Code.
232
 The court may, therefore, dismiss a petition 
by individual debtor whose debts are consumer debts when it is found that the 
filing is “substantial abuse” of chapter 7.
233
 This was designed to limit the access to 
Chapter 7 and force debtors to chapter 13 filing.
234
 There was no agreement on 
what constitutes “substantial abuse”.
235
 One view was that criterion was that the 
individuals’ ability to pay their debt without undue hardships amounts abuse.
236
  
Another view advocates for the ‘totality of circumstances’ test such as 
unconscionable spending or fraud.
237
 
The 2005 Bankruptcy Act responds to the problem and come up with grounds 
of dismissal of Chapter 7 claims when there is abuse.
238
 The first ground to be used 
to filter what can be brought under Chapter 7 is ‘means test’.
239
 This test will make 
sure that the debtor’s income is low enough to chapter 7 filing. If debtor’s income 
is below the applicable median, then that is the end of the story. S/he can file a 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy. If the debtor’s income, including his/her spouse if married, 
is more the applicable median for the family size considered, an application for 
Chapter 7 might be dismissed up on the application of trustee, interested parties, or 
court on its own motion.
240
 If there is disposable income, necessary expenses 
(food, cloth, health care, etc.) deducted from average monthly income for the last 
six months, abuse is presumed and debtor will not qualify for Chapter 7.
241
 By this 
filtering process, individuals with high income will be forced to go for chapter 
 
230 See CHARLES J. TABB & RALPH BRUBAKER, supra note 7,103. 
231 See Mann, Ronald J., Bankruptcy Reform and The 'Sweat Box' of Credit Card Debt, U. ILL. L. 
REV., 2006, at 377-378. 
232 See CHARLES J. TABB & RALPH BRUBAKER, supra note 7, at 104. 
233 Id., at 103-104; see also David G. Epstein et al, supra note 41, at 56-57. 
234 See Ronald J. Mann, supra note 231, at 377. 
235 See Carl Felsenfeld, supra note 175, at 1369. 
236 Id. p. 1369; see also DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL, supra note 41, at 57-58. 
237 See Carl Felsenfeld, supra note 175, at 1369. 
238 See BARRY E. ADLER ET AL, supra note 110, at 79-80. 
239 Id.; see section 707 (b); see also Robert H. Scott, III, supra note 174, at 947. 
240 See BARRY E. ADLER ET AL, supra note 110, at 79-80. 
241 See Ronald J. Mann, supra note 231, at 380. 
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13.
242
Means test solely rests on the ability to pay.
243
 But means test has pitfall of its 
own. It does not distinguish between unforeseen financial trouble (sudden illness, 
loss of job, divorce) and reckless indebtedness (using credit for luxuries and 
recreations).
244
 Accordingly, there still exists the possibility of abuse of the system 
by later categories of debtors. 
Qualifying the ‘means test’, however, is not the end of the story. Still the 
court may find Chapter 7 applications abusive and dismiss or convert it to chapter 
13 accordingly.
245
 Abusive or bad faith petitioners will see their case dismissed 
under the “totality of circumstances test”.
246
 This test will catch debtors who 
escaped the filtration process under means test. It does not have a clear formula as 
in the case of means test, a supplementary case-by-case analysis. 
The 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection is, 
therefore, trying to make Chapter 7 discharge less attractive and want to limit it to 
those who really need it. Accordingly, those individuals capable of earning and 
paying a certain portion of their debt should use the Chapter 13 procedure. 
2. Chapter 13 
Chapter 13 is a debt adjustment plan
247
 for consumer bankruptcy, like 
reorganization of businesses. It is intended for the use of individuals with regular 
income
248
 and those who want to keep some of their assets.
249
 Its use has become 
more popular by debtors who own small businesses and debtors who failed in 
payment for debt secured by mortgage.
250
 Unlike Chapter 7 bankruptcies, under 
Chapter 13 there is no liquidation and all the debtor has to do is to come up with a 
plan of repayment
251
 that should be accepted by the bankruptcy judge.
252
 Debtor is 
not required to give up his/her assets, exempt or otherwise, and only has to propose 
a plan for repayment to be executed in the future, usually lasts between 3 to 5 
 
242 Id. 
243 See BARRY E. ADLER ET AL, supra note 110, at 80. 
244 Id. 
245 Id., at 81. 
246 Id. 
247 See Michelle J. White, supra note 19, at 210; see also DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL, supra note 41, 
at 13.  
248 See Michelle J. White, supra  note 156,at 691. 
249 See Elijah M. Alper,  supra note 174, at 1914. 
250 See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, supra note 45, at 50. 
251 See THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, supra note 183, § 1322. 
252 See Michelle J. White, supra note 19, at 210. 
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years.
253
 Under Chapter 13 the debtor keeps his/her assets but has to give up 
his/her future income.
254
 That means the debtor has to pay the creditors in 
installments out of his ‘disposable income’. 
A Chapter 13 discharge allows discharge of some of the debts that are 
‘excepted’ under section 523(a).
255
 With the exceptions of “alimony and child 
support, student loan, DUI (driving under influence) debts, and debts for restitution 
of criminal fine,”
256
 all other debts that were ‘excepted’ under Chapter 7 case are 
dischargeable under Chapter 13. In this regard, a Chapter 13 discharge is much 
broader than Chapter 7 discharge. This is intended to incentivize filing under 
Chapter 13 where the debtor has to pay a portion of his debts allowing creditors’ a 
repayment to a certain extent. The discharge under this chapter is, therefore, called 
“super discharge” making only very few debts non-dischargeable.
257
 Hence, under 
Chapter 13 plan, it is possible for the debtor to keep all his assets while enjoying 
wider scope of dischargeable debts.
258
 
Unlike in Chapter 7, there is a restriction on the use of chapter 13.
259
  Debtor 
with a debt of more than 250,000 for unsecured and 750,000 for secured debts are 
not eligible for chapter 13 bankruptcy.
260
 One can see from the above figures that 
“chapter 13 is designed for working with individual debtors or couples with 
limited financial affairs, typically consumers or proprietors of small businesses.”
261
 
Chapter 13 plan is subjected to important conditions. First, the plan shall 
provide for the full satisfaction, in differed payments, of all claims entitled to 
priority under section 507 unless the holder of the priority claims agrees to a 
different treatment of such claim.
262
 The plan should not discriminate between 
claims of a particular class, if any.
263
 Second, the debtor has to pay his/her 
 
253 See Michelle J. White, supra note 19, at 210; see also Barry Adler et al, supra note 175, at 
587;  Michelle J. White, supra note 156, at 691.  
254 See BARRY E. ADLER ET AL, supra note 110, at 621. 
255 See CHARLES J. TABB & RALPH BRUBAKER, supra note 7, at 511; Michelle J. White, supra note 
156, at 210; see also BARRY E. ADLER ET AL, supra note 110, at 621. 
256 See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, supra note 45, at 49; see also Charles J. TABB & RALPH BRUBAKER, 
supra note 7, at 511. 
257 See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, supra note 45, at 48. 
258 Id., at 49-50. 
259 Id., at 50; see also BARRY E. ADLER ET AL, supra note 110, at 621. 
260 Id.; See also THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, supra note 183, § 109. The amount is subject to change 
every 3 year by regulation to reflect inflation. 
261 See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, supra note 45, at 49. 
262 See THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, supra note 183, § 1322 (2). 
263 Id. 
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disposable income for five years, if not the creditor should receive, as of the 
effective debt of the plan, an amount he/she would have received if the debtor 
opted for a Chapter 7 bankruptcy.
264
 This will ensure that the creditor is not going 
to be treated less favorably than he would have been under chapter 7. 
Generally, Chapter 13 has several advantages over Chapter 7 bankruptcy.  
First, creditors are more protected under Chapter 13 than Chapter 7. They are paid 
from a projected ‘disposable income’ in 3 and 5 years if income is less than the 
median and above the median respectively.
265
 And Chapter 13 cases pay creditors 
more than Chapter 7 do. As it is discussed under section 1.4, most often, Chapter 7 
cases leave no asset and chance of the creditors getting paid is very slim. The 
second benefit is the debtor can keep his/her assets and collaterals under Chapter 
13. This will avoid the giving up of an asset to the creditor who may value the 
property less than the debtor values it. Finally, under Chapter 13, there are only 
few non-dischargeable debts than under Chapter 7. 
Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 have, therefore, basic differences. Chapter 7 is 
designed for lower middle class working persons while Chapter 13 is intended to 
be used by wage earners and working individuals with limited financial affairs. In 
a Chapter 7 case, the debtor has to give up all his non-exempt assets to the 
creditors, but in Chapter 13, debtor keeps the assets and pay out of future income. 
So, in the former case, future income is protected, but in the latter, assets and 
existing property are protected. In addition, discharge under Chapter 7 is automatic 
and it bars any move by the creditor for the enforcement of his/her claim, but the 
discharge under Chapter 13 is after the completion of the plan.
266
 
3. Chapter 12 
Chapter 12 is a special chapter intended for the use of family farmers and 
fishermen with regular income.
267
 Special treatment for farmers under bankruptcy 
dates back to 1898
268
 but the protection was on temporary basis.
269
 This was in 
response to the farm crises that affected many farmers and subjected them to 




264 See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, supra note 45, at 50-51. 
265 See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, supra note 45, at 51. 
266 See THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, supra note 183, § 1328. 
267 See DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL, supra  note 41, at 15; see also the Bankruptcy Code, supra note 
183, § 109 (f). 
268 See Katherine M. Porter, Phantom Farmers: Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code, 79 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 729 (2005), at 730. 
269 See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, supra note 45, at 57. 
270 See Katherine M. Porter, supra note 268, at 731. 
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became part of the Bankruptcy Code on permanent basis after the Bankruptcy 
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005.
271
 
What is peculiar in Chapter 12 from Chapter 13 is that the former is restricted 
to farmers and fishermen use while the later can be used by individuals with 
regular income irrespective of the source of such income.
272
 The two chapters are 
also different in the type of debtor entitled to relief under the respective chapters. 
In Chapter 12, partnerships and corporations can file for relief while Chapter 13 is 
restricted to individuals with regular income.
273
 The debt ceiling is also higher in 
Chapter 12 than in Chapter 13 making debt adjustment opportunity wider.
274
 
The Chapter tries to strike a balance between two conflicting interests.
275
  On 
the one hand the law makes sure that the farmers still hold their farms and 
fishermen their boats even when they owe secured creditors more than the value of 
their assets (land or boat).
276
 On the other hand, the law has to ensure the security 
interest and rights on the property creditors have.
277
 
Despite its long history and ambition, the achievement of Chapter 12 is being 
criticized as insignificant.
278
 There are very few Chapter 12 bankruptcy cases.
279
  
One reason is that farmers in United States are very few in number (the number is 
dropping) and Chapter 12 filings are few compared to other types of 
bankruptcies.
280
 Another possible reason is that farmers opt for Chapter 7 or 13 
bankruptcies because farmers face similar grounds for being in financial distress, 
such as illness or divorce, and not necessarily secured farm debt. There are also 
evidences that bankruptcy contribution to the decline in farms in United States is 
insignificant making the response by way of chapter 12 unviable.
281
 These reasons 
might have a hand in the limited use of chapter 12 filing while the number is 
soaring in Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 bankruptcy. 
 
271 See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, supra note 45, at 57. 
272 See DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL, supra note 41, at 16. 
273 See Katherine M. Porter, supra note 268, at 732. 
274 Id. 
275 See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, supra note 45, at 56. 
276 Id. 
277 Id. 
278 See Katherine M. Porter, supra note 268, at 741. 
279 Id. 
280 Id. 
281 Id., at  742. 
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B. Individual Insolvency Law in Germany 
Before the enactment of the 1999 Insolvency Act, consumer debtors in 
Germany were not allowed to file for bankruptcy. Pre-1999 German insolvency 
laws were not favorable to consumer debtors.
282
 Theoretically, it was possible to 
enter into settlement agreements between debtors and creditors that provide for 
less-than-full payment of the debt.
283
 But there were hurdles from realizing the 
benefits of such arrangement. On the one hand, the creditors’ consent is required 
for the settlement that may in most cases go against the interest of the debtor.
284
 On 
the other hand, the debtor has to have a plan for payment of at least certain 
percentage of the claims, which was not affordable by most consumers.
285
 
Moreover, the debtor should have a certain level of minimum assets to defray costs 
of proceedings.
286
 This made individuals’ access to the then insolvency laws a 
theoretical possibility than practical reality. Even for those who passed the hurdle, 
there was no such a thing called discharge
287
 and the law was meant to facilitate 
creditors’ collection efforts.
288
 Debtors were supposed to repay their debt no matter 
how difficult it might be. The core of this policy was protection of the principle of 
party autonomy, and intervention by way of discharge was seen as against this 
principle.
289
 Accordingly, before the 1999 German Insolvency Act, individuals’ 
access to bankruptcy was very limited and discharge was not possible.
290
 For the 
first time, consumer bankruptcy and discharge was introduced in the 1999 
Insolvency Act.
291
 This was as a reaction to rising over-indebtedness problem that 





282 See Jason J. Kilborn, supra note 158, at 262. 
283 Id. 
284 Id. 
285 Id., at 262-263. 
286 Id., at 263. 
287 See Susanne Braun, German Insolvency Act: Special Provisions of Consumer Insolvency 
Proceedings and the Discharge of Residual Debts, 7 GERMAN L. J. 59 (2006), at 65-66, available 
athttp://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=11&artID=686, (last visited on 29 March 
2014). 
288 See Jason J. Kilborn, supra note 158, at 264-265 & 269. 
289 See Susanne Braun, supra note 287, at 66; see also Jason J. Kilborn, supra note 158, at 268. 
290 See Robert Anderson et al, (ed.) supra note 6, at 21. 
291 Id., at 21 & 59; see JOHANNA NIEMI ET AL, supra note 3, at 274. 
292 See Susanne Braun, supra note 287, at 60; see generally Jason J. Kilborn, supra note 158, at 
260-262; see also JOHANNA NIEMI ET AL, supra note 3, at 273. 
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Currently, honest debtors are entitled to relief by way of individual 
insolvency.
293
 Individual can request the court for the discharge of his/her debt 
under Section 287 of the Insolvency Act of 1999.
294
 Discharge and fresh-start 
under German law is intended to protect the individual from undue harassment and 
reintegrate him/her economically.
295
 The requirement to file for individual 
insolvency is inability to pay debts, illiquidity, when they fallen due.
296
 The 
insolvency should be permanent.
297
 Over-indebtedness is not a requirement to 
institute consumer bankruptcy proceedings.
298
 To institute individual insolvency 
proceeding, the debtor has to cover proceeding cost under the pain of dismissal
299
 
and should have assets to pay certain portion of his/her debt to the creditors.  
The German model of discharge is known as “an earned fresh start” and the 
individual debtor has to pass through different stages and a long six-years of hard 
work, paying a portion of his/her debt and showing good behavior.
300
 Individual 
insolvency proceeding in Germany involves four stages.
301
 The first stage is out-
of-court settlement phase.
302
 It is a compulsory requirement for the debtor to try to 
reach an amicable settlement of the debt before opting for insolvency proceeding.  
To that effect, a certificate from attorney or credit counseling institution is 
necessary.
303
 In the second phase, the same attempt, with the discretion of the 
court, may be repeated before courts.
304
 This is because the out-of-court settlement 
could be easily defeated by the refusal of one of the creditors.
305
 In this phase, the 
court may force dissenting creditors to accept the plan on condition that the plan 
 
293 See GERMAN INSOLVENCY CODE OF 5 OCTOBER 1994 (BGBl. [FEDERAL LAW GAZETTE] I, at 
2866), last amended under Art. 2 G dated 21 October 2011 (Federal Law Gazette I, at 2082, 
hereinafter, German Insolvency Code), Section 286 & ff.  
294 See Susanne Braun, supra note 287, at 66. 
295 Id. 
296 See GERMAN INSOLVENCY CODE, supra note 293, section 17. 
297 See Susanne Braun, supra note 287, at 63. 
298 See GERMAN INSOLVENCY CODE, supra note 293, Section 19. 
299 See generally Susanne Braun, supra note 287; see also the German Insolvency Code, section 
26 (1). 
300 See Robert Anderson et al, (ed.) supra note 6, at 21; See Susanne Braun, supra note 287, at  
66. 
301 See JOHANNA NIEMI, ET AL, supra note 3, at 274-75; M. Gerhardt, Consumer Bankruptcy 
Regimes and Credit Default in the US and Europe: A Comparative Study, (CEPS Working Document 
No. 318, 27 July 2009, at 8), available at http://aei.pitt.edu/11336 / (last visited on 11 March 2014). 
302 See Jason J. Kilborn, supra note 158, a t272: JOHANNA NIEMI ETAL, supra note 3, at 274-275. 
303 See Robert Anderson et al, (ed.) supra note 6, at 21 & 60; see THE GERMAN INSOLVENCY 
CODE, supra note 293, sec. 305 (1). 
304 See Robert Anderson et al, (ed.) supra note 6, at 21. 
305 See Jason J. Kilborn, supra note 158, at 275-276. 
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does not discriminate those creditors unduly.
306
 The importance of this phase is 
declining through time.
307
 If all efforts of negotiated settlement, out of court or 
court supervised, fail simplified liquidation procedure will follow.
308
 This is the 
third phase of consumer bankruptcy process.
309
 The debtor is required to turn over 
all non-exempt assets, if any, to the trustee appointed by the court, assets will be 
sold and proceeds thereof will be paid to the creditors 
310
 in addition to covering 
the cost of proceedings. But like in the United States Chapter 7 cases, this phase 




The last phase is where the debtor will be put to a six-year-long “good 
behavior period”, successful completion of which will bless the debtor with 
discharge.
312
  This is followed by a kind of probation-type period, known as “good 
behavior”, where the debtor has to show good character paying a certain portion of 
his/her income, engage in gainful employment, transfer to the trustee half of the 
value of the property from inheritance, inform his change of addresses etc for a 
period of six years.
313
 After successful six-year payment period, discharge will be 
granted, save for exceptional cases where it may be denied.
314
 The grounds of 
denial of discharge include criminal conviction, fraudulent or false written 
statements about his economic situation, grant or refusal of discharge in ten years 




There are certain debts that are ‘excepted’ from discharge, hence non-
dischargeable. These include tort claims, fines, administrative penalties and 
incidental consequences of administrative or criminal offence, liabilities from 
interest-free loans granted to the debtor to pay costs of insolvency proceedings.
316
 
If the court decides to give discharge and fresh start for the debtor, the trustee will 
be appointed and emoluments will be vested to the trustee by way of statement of 
 
306 Id., at 276. 
307 Id., at 276-277. 
308 Id., at 278. 
309 See JOHANNA NIEMI ET AL, supra note 3, at 275. 
310 See Robert Anderson et al (ed.), supra note 6, at 21. 
311 See Jason J. Kilborn, supra note 158, at 278-79; JOHANNA NIEMI ET AL, supra note 3, at 336. 
312 See M. Gerhardt, supra note 305, at 8; see also Jason J. Kilborn, supra note 158, at 272. 
313 See Robert Anderson et al, (ed.) supra note 6, at 21; See Susanne Braun, supra note 287, at 
66; see also THE GERMAN INSOLVENCY CODE, supra note 293, section 295.  
314 The GERMAN INSOLVENCY CODE, supra note 293, Sections 300 & 296. 
315 Id., Section 296. 
316 Id., Section 302. 
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assignment.
317
 The trustee is responsible for monitoring the distribution of assets 
during the debtor’s “good behavior” period.  
The scope and nature of discharge introduced is, however, different, by far, 
from that of United State’s concept of discharge.
318
 There is no full discharge as in 
United States and it is not European way to let the debtor walk-off without paying 
anything.
319
 The European understanding of consumer bankruptcy is rather re-
adjustment and rehabilitation where by the individual debtor has to earn the fresh 
start by his effort. This recognizes “human capital” as valuable economic interest 
both for debtor and creditor in credit transaction.
320
 This is a departure from the 
conventional view that credits are provided against tangible assets.
321
 The debtor 
will be released only of the residual debts and enjoy fresh start. Accordingly, all 
creditors, even those who did not file a claim, are barred from any collection 
efforts against the debtor.
322
 
Under German individual insolvency proceedings, it is not true that the 
creditors will be paid during the “good behavior” period. As in the case of United 
States’ Chapter 7 cases, in most cases, the plan may not pay at all.
323
 This is due to 
high level of exemption on the future income of the debtor. There are scholars who 
question the need for such six-year-long financial probation period of “good 
behavior” if it is proved that it is not paying the creditors, at least in most cases.
324
  
According to them, the German model of discharge is rigid because it does not 
distinguish between those who really are able to make a certain percentage of 
payments (those who can cope with the “good behavior period”) and those who 
cannot.
325
 No matter how penniless the debtor is or in urgent need of immediate 
fresh start, the six-years-long process and accompanying obligations nevertheless 
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has to be followed.
326
 There are two European approaches in this regard. Some 
jurisdictions such as France and Sweden have such distinction with the view of 
helping those penniless debtors get immediate discharge without going through the 
period of repayment plan.
327
 This is what some scholars call it the “mercy 
model”.
328
 But the German approach, known as “liability model”,
329
 sticks on the 
repayment of the debt. This is the weakness of the German individual insolvency 
law because it is not tailored according to the need of different types of debtors. 
Some other scholars see that rule in a positive way than letting the debtor 
walk-off right after the conclusion of the insolvency proceeding.
330
 According to 
this later view, by doing so, the hidden policy of the German law is to teach the 
debtor’s financial responsibility and reintegrate him to the society than paying 
creditors.
331
  In fact such good behavior period is a kind of financial responsibility 
lesson for the debtor. So the six-year period have a rehabilitative function. 
However, it isstill questionable whether this lesson’s value is worth for penniless 
debtors who will be doomed to lead poor living standard abandoning several social 
activities, cutting nutrition, engaging in illicit economic activities etc.
332
 
Another shortcoming in the individual insolvency practice in Germany is the 
limited availability of debt counseling institutions.
333
 This will put the viability of 
out-of-court settlement phase in question for the indigent debtor.
334
 Debt 
counseling has become very crucial instrument of dealing with consumer 
bankruptcy problems and the access and quality of the service has significant 
impact in the individual insolvency legal regime. Despite these benefits there seem 
to be a limited access to the service in Germany. 
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IV. OVERVIEW OF ETHIOPIAN BANKRUPTCY LAW AND VIABILITY OF 
INTRODUCING CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY LAW TO ETHIOPIA 
Bankruptcy issues under Ethiopian law are, in principle, governed under Book 
V of the Commercial Code of Ethiopia adopted in 1960.
335
 The sources of this law 
are the 1955 French bankruptcy legislation and Italian Insolvency Act of 1942.
336
 
Ethiopian bankruptcy law is one of the most unsuccessful legal transplants in 
terms of practical utility.
337
 Several factors accounted for the disuse of the 
bankruptcy provisions of the Commercial Code in court of law. The first reason 
was socialist political economy that prevailed in the country from 1974 through 
1991 where the government controlled almost all economic activities.
338
 Entrance 
and exit in the market was not determined by economic factors. There was no 
competition in the market and the only player was the government. That had 
affected the use of bankruptcy procedure until 1991. The other reason is that 
bankruptcy has not been in the academic curriculum of Ethiopian law schools and 
legal professional have little knowledge and experience in the subject.
339
 It is only 
recently that this subject is in the curriculum of law schools. Finally, different 
legislations such as foreclosure laws undermined the role bankruptcy could have 
played in the business.
340
 So, the bankruptcy law of Ethiopia is least used and least 
developed subject.  
The stance of Ethiopian bankruptcy law, as applied to businesses, is not even 
business friendly. A look at the structure of the Code reveals that Ethiopian 
bankruptcy law is pro-liquidation than reorganization of businesses.
341
 
Ethiopian law limits the application of the bankruptcy law to traders and 
excludes non-trader individuals from its scope.
342
 Hence, the subjects of 
bankruptcy law are only “traders” i.e., persons engaged in commercial activities 
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within the meaning of Article 5 of the Commercial Code. Individuals can only file 
for bankruptcy if they qualify as traders and the debt is commercial debt.
343
 It is 
consistent with the old times classical bankruptcy law philosophy that restricted 
the procedure to merchants only.  
Before and after Ethiopian bankruptcy law was adopted, the traditional 
function of bankruptcy law in most, if not all, jurisdictions was liquidating and 
reorganizing businesses. Ethiopian legislatures adopt the same philosophy the 
revised 1955 French bankruptcy legislation had towards bankruptcy. But the latter 
has departed from the philosophy that restricted bankruptcy law to merchants in 
1989 and today individuals are entitled to relief in the form of discharge.
344
 
The justifications for excluding individuals from the 1960 bankruptcy law are 
obvious; access to credit and indebtedness used to be issues for businesses and not 
consumers. And important moral and legal principle under Ethiopian contract law 
that “failure to keep a promise is worse than losing a descendant” an equivalent of 
‘Pacta sunt servanda’ demands debts to be paid than the law intervene to free 
individuals from their repayment obligations. In this regard Ethiopian bankruptcy 
law was perfect of its time.  
There were several reasons that make the 1960 Commercial Code bankruptcy 
provisions adequate enough for the needs of the time, at least until 1991. In 
Ethiopian business activities were least developed and dominated by small and 
medium government owned (public) enterprises. There was no competition in the 
market and there was no risk of failure and exiting the market. Publicly financed 
companies or businesses will continue operating even at loss. It is only after 1991 
that the Ethiopian economic policy was shifted to market economy giving the way 
for private businesses and entrepreneurial activities to emerge. Another reason 
accounted for the merchant oriented bankruptcy law is that in Ethiopia debt was 
not something good and access to consumer credit was very limited. Failure to 
repay one’s debt is still highly stigmatized. With these factors,the bankruptcy law 
as incorporated under the Commercial Code was adequate enough to ensure 
creditors protection, the only concerns of bankruptcy law of the time. But the law 
failed to keep track of changed bankruptcy philosophies and developments
345
 in 
response to the development of commerce, entrepreneurship, availability of 
consumer credit, consumer over-indebtedness, and absence of government social 
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18-May-159:49 AM 
38 Haramaya Law Review                                                            [Vol. 3:1 
safety net programs. 
Currently, the Ethiopian Commercial Code is under revision and there are 
recommendations from some scholars and experts for the inclusion of consumer 
bankruptcy into the upcoming amendment.
346
 Others simply call for the policy 
makers to reconsider the issue of consumer bankruptcy emphasizing on the 
benefits it has towards entrepreneurship.
347
 Therefore, whether Ethiopia has to 
introduce consumer bankruptcy law, factors calling for change of paradigm, the 
model it has to follow, if at all consumer bankruptcy is demanding, will be 
discussed in the coming sections. 
A. Consumer Bankruptcy Law for Ethiopia 
As pointed out so far in this article
348
 bankruptcy law used to be restricted to 
the use of merchants and to protect creditors and help them in debt collection 
process, mainly through liquidation. Accordingly, only businesses were concerns 
of most bankruptcy legislations worldwide. This is still true under Ethiopian law 
where only businesses, and not consumers, can apply for bankruptcy.  
Today, in other jurisdictions the scope of bankruptcy law has been extended 
to individuals as well. In United Kingdom and United States, consumer bankruptcy 
was introduced as a reaction to liberalization of credit and the accompanying over-
indebtedness.
349
 In Germany, the consumer insolvency rules were introduced in the 
1999 Insolvency Act with a view to giving relief to debtors after the consumer 
over-indebtedness that occurred since 1970s. In France, consumer bankruptcy and 
debt readjustment were introduced in 1989 because of consumer over-
indebtedness. This is true for most European countries that liberalized their 
bankruptcy law to include consumer debtors. 
As discussed in section II (C) several factors led to justify the adoption of 
consumer bankruptcy into the legislations of many jurisdictions. Some of the 
reasons include, but are not limited to, industrialization, expansion of trade and 
commerce, deregulation of credit, individuals’ access to credit and indebtedness, 
entrepreneurial friendly policies, reduction in the welfare activities of 
governments, etc. The question worth asking at this point is whether there is a need 
to introduce consumer bankruptcy rules to the Ethiopian legal system. There are no 
 
346 See Tilahun Teshome et al, supra note 342, at 82-83; In fact these experts suggest, as I agree, 
that consumer bankruptcy matters being non-commercial will fit into separate legislation or civil 
procedure code.  
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18-May-159:49 AM 
Fall 2014]   Consumer Bankruptcy Law for Ethiopia                                                  39 
empirical studies on increasing consumer debt or over-indebtedness in Ethiopia. 
And nothing is written on the issue. But taking the experience of the different 
jurisdictions studied in this article, introducing consumer bankruptcy as well as 
discharge and fresh start to Ethiopia will have a paramount importance. 
Generally, bankruptcy law provides an alternative to judicial procedures of 
enforcing claims. As such, it solves the following problems inherent in non-
bankruptcy procedure of enforcement of claims. Non-bankruptcy law provides for 
a procedure where creditors, individually, using state’s power, seize non-exempt 
assets of the debtor to satisfy their claims. But non-bankruptcy law only regulates 
relationship between debtor and creditor and not creditors inter se. This will lead to 
several wasteful litigations, in terms of courts’ time and parties’ costs, as there are 
multiple creditors. The debtor will also be harassed as many times as there are 
creditors. It may also happen that first comer will take everything and hence, 
inequitable for the other creditors. So, consumer bankruptcy will solve collective 
action problem in the same way business bankruptcy does.
350
 The assets of the 
individual will be given to a person, trustee, who has to liquidate and distribute to 
the creditors according to their share in the claims. This justification of bankruptcy, 
though the pioneer reason, is becoming obsolete because the debtor has no assets 
in most straight bankruptcy cases. Nevertheless, this justification for consumer 
bankruptcy is still cited as one of the most important justification. Consumer 
bankruptcy and fresh start is also a good incentive for debtor’s cooperation in the 
collection process. If the debtor knows that he will be forgiven he will not hide or 
transfer assets and disrupt the opportunity to start afresh. Generally, there is an 
incentive not to engage in any fraudulent activities and disrupt the debt collection 
procedure. 
It is discussed that many countries have adopted consumer bankruptcy laws 
after they deregulated their credit markets. In Ethiopia, there is no such 
deregulation and rather the financial sector is highly regulated and dominated by 
state banks.
351
 Nevertheless, individuals, especially from urban areas, are getting 
access to credits.
352
 In addition to state banks, there are several private banks, 
micro-finance institutions and saving and credit associations operating in the 
 
350 See Margaret Howard, Supra note 27, at 1049. 
351 Ethiopia; Financial Sector Profile, available at http://www.mfw4a.org/ethiopia/ethiopia-
financial-sector-profile.html (last visited on 16 March 2014). 
352 Commercial Bank of Ethiopia; 
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18-May-159:49 AM 
40 Haramaya Law Review                                                            [Vol. 3:1 
country. Individuals are having access to unsecured consumer credit directly or 
indirectly and are, therefore, exposed to the risk of misguided indebtedness 
problems. This will make more sense when Ethiopia introduces credit card system 
in the future. 
From the debtor’s perspective, consumer bankruptcy will solve the dis-
incentive of the debtor to acquire property or engage in gainful employment in the 
future if there is a judgment creditor who is waiting to enforce a claim against the 
debtor. Without discharge and fresh start, “honest but unfortunate debtor” will be 
alerted perpetually by the judgment creditor looking to satisfy his claims. 
Consumer bankruptcy will play a role in providing relief, rehabilitation and 
reintegration tool. 
Like in other jurisdictions, the social-insurance function of bankruptcy can be 
a good reason to adopt consumer bankruptcy law to the Ethiopian legal system. 
Studies show that, in countries where there are extensive welfare and safety-net 
programs by the government, there are limited reliefs or no relief at all under their 
bankruptcy law.
353
 Conversely, in countries where there are no social safety net 
programs, there is a generous relief under their consumer bankruptcy law. In 
Ethiopia, the governmental social security scheme and safety net programs are 
very limited and inadequate. This gap can be addressed by adopting well-crafted 
consumer bankruptcy law.  
Entrepreneurial analysis of bankruptcy also suits the current entrepreneurial 
policy of Ethiopia. Entrepreneurship is an area where Ethiopia is trying hard as 
part of the poverty reduction strategy. The first debt, before starting a business, is 
usually a personal (consumer) debt. Not being traders, entrepreneurs will not be 
allowed to file for bankruptcy under Ethiopian law. When the entrepreneur failed 
to repay the amount he owed for his start-up, he will be treated under non-
bankruptcy law and will be harassed by judgment creditor indefinitely. This is not 
good for entrepreneurship. When entrepreneurs are punished for their failure, they 
will have less incentive to take risks. In order to encourage entrepreneurship and 
risk taking, among other things, consumer bankruptcy law that will forgive 
genuine debtors, who failed in their startups, is important. This will complement 
the current entrepreneurial policy of Ethiopia.  
Furthermore, in Ethiopia most of the businesses are carried out at the level of 
mid-scale, small and micro enterprises that include partnerships and sole 
proprietorships. In fact the persons engaged in any of those business vehicles have 
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the access to bankruptcy law because they are traders within the meaning of 
Article 5 of the commercial code.
354
 But the fact that the liability of the owners is 
unlimited in these unincorporated businesses will make it very risky for individuals 
to engage in these businesses.
355
 Individual owner will not benefit out of 
bankruptcy once the business is gone. Creditors still can have an action against the 
debtor because of unlimited liability, in most cases. This will have negative impact 
on entrepreneurship and self-employment. So adopting consumer bankruptcy law 
insures such risk taking by entrepreneurs.  
Moreover, today indebtedness is not a matter for businesses only. That 
phenomenon has gone long ago when credit was only available for businesses. 
Today credit is available for consumers as well and indebtedness also affects real 
people. To this effect, consumer bankruptcy with adequate discharge is proved to 
be a good solution. There should be the chance for those who defaulted in their 
obligation to start life as productive members of the society. They should be 
forgiven and rehabilitated. 
In conclusion, indebtedness is a universal problem. All countries, whether 
industrialized or not, face the problem of indebtedness. If it is a real problem for 
developed countries with high per-capita, high employment rate and developed 
insurance schemes, it should, for a stronger reason, be a problem in Ethiopia, 
which is at the opposite tail of those indicators. Different jurisdictions adopt 
consumer bankruptcy and give relief for those debtors in the form of discharge and 
fresh start. The primary goal of consumer bankruptcy and fresh start is tied with 
the problem of indebtedness but it is also justified out of the reasons discussed 
above and other parts of the thesis. It is, therefore, my argument that Ethiopia 
should adopt consumer bankruptcy law.
356
 
B. Which Model for Ethiopia? 
The question worth to be asked at this juncture is the kind of debt relief 
system that can be adopted to suit the special situation of the country. The models 
of relief and scope of fresh start differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and 
depends on several factors such as the socio-economic and political situations of 
each country. Some jurisdiction, like United States, give generous relief and 
automatic discharge while others, such as Germany, gives the relief in a different 
 
354 See The COMMERCIAL CODE OF ETHIOPIA, supra note 335, Article 5 & 968. 
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way from the former. In United States the consumer bankruptcy has three 
categories namely chapter 7 (for all individuals), chapter 12 (farmers and 
fishermen) and 13 (wage earners and working couples).
357
 The United States 
model is tailored to fit the special needs of different segments of the society. 
Chapter 7 is designed for those debtors who have not the ability to pay their debts. 
Chapter 12 is designed for the special need of farmers and fishermen who need to 
keep their land and farm instruments even when those assets are given as a security 
for debts. Chapter 13 is a repayment plan for those who are able to pay out of their 
future income. Chapter 13 is, therefore, similar to the German repayment plan 
procedure. In Germany, there is only one procedure for all individuals and they 
have to go through series of procedures such as negotiated settlement, both out-of-
court and in-court, and culminated in the repayment plan the successful completion 
of which will earn the debtor fresh start.
358
 
For Ethiopia, I will suggest that German-type consumer bankruptcy that 
would fit to the realities of the country. Ethiopia is one of the world’s poorest 
countries.
359
 Yet, it is one of the fastest growing economies.
360
 There is a need for 
consumer bankruptcy as the economy is growing and credits are becoming 
available.  But also, a generous discharge of debts will not be a viable option for a 
very infant economy Ethiopia has. So, the consumer bankruptcy I am advocating 
should take into consideration these factors.  
To have a United States type generous discharge and tailored to the different 
segments of the society will not be viable solution for the country for reasons that 
are socio-economic. One the one hand a generous discharge as in the United States 
will hurt the financial sector. More importantly, it will be unbearable burden for 
Ethiopia if a financial crisis, such as the global financial crisis in 2008, occurs in 
Ethiopia. The other reason against United States-type consumer bankruptcy is that 
credit is not available for everyone in Ethiopia. Credits are, mostly, available for 
people living in urban areas. Most of the entrepreneurial activities and start-ups are 
also concentrated in major cities and urban areas making the risk of indebtedness 
more acute for this segment of the society. In rural areas, for farmers, access to 
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credit is very limited and they are not exposed to the risk of over-indebtedness. 
Indeed, farmers have access to credit through micro finance and rural saving and 
credit associations. One could also state that in Ethiopia farmers do take credits in 
the form of fertilizers and improved seed varieties and are thus exposed to the risk 
of indebtedness. But all these credits are highly regulated and monitored by 
government and saving and credit associations on a day-to-day basis. Hence, the 
risk on farmers is not a serious one. Moreover, ownership of land belongs to the 
government and individuals are not exposed to the risk of losing their land because 
of debt.
361
This is true for small-scale individual farmers and the assertion may not 
apply to mechanized farming owned by investors. Therefore, farmers do not need 
special protection like their United States’ counterpart. The other reason for not 
adopting United States-type consumer bankruptcy is the societies’ attitude towards 
failure to pay one’s debt.  In Ethiopia, failure to pay one’s debt is highly 
stigmatized. As the saying goes, “failure to keep a promise is worse than losing a 
descendant.”   This is the equivalent of ‘pacta sunt servanda’, which is a grand 
norm in contract law. Devising a rule for Ethiopia like the United States 
bankruptcy law, where the debtor just walks-off without paying a penny, will be 
against the belief of the business community. Also consumer bankruptcy law to be 
adopted shall be just a single type of procedure, as in Germany, to everyone. 
Another issue that comes with adopting consumer bankruptcy procedure is the 
issue of who will finance the system. It will be huge burden for a country like 
Ethiopia, especially in case of financial crises, to cover costs of proceeding in 
consumer bankruptcy cases where the debtor may not have sufficient assets for that 
purpose. In order to solve this problem, the conditions of discharge should be 
devised in such a way that the individual debtor has to cover the costs of 
proceedings and come up with a plan of repayment for a certain period of time. 
That should be the price individual has to pay to get a fresh start. This will make 
sure that the financial/ credit market is not going to be hurt and the individual after 
successful completion of the plan will get fresh start. Introducing consumer 
bankruptcy law does not require a separate institution or bankruptcy courts in 
Ethiopia. It will be brought to the same court and judges that handle business 
bankruptcy cases. The trustee system is also already in place. Therefore, there is no 
additional cost to set up institutions in this regard. 
In conclusion, designing consumer bankruptcy regime needs careful 
considerations of socio-economic situations of the country. The effect of consumer 
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bankruptcy system is that honest and deserving debtors will get fresh start. In 
doing so consumers are protected from bad lending practices. With fresh start 
worth entrepreneurship ideas are encouraged and failed individuals are 
rehabilitated and reintegrated back to the society. In Ethiopia introducing 
consumer bankruptcy with discharge and fresh start for “worthy debtors” will have 
paramount importance in several aspects of life. For one thing, individuals may be 
in serious need of credit due to changed circumstances such as illness, loss of job, 
divorce, as do people from other jurisdictions. Without consumer bankruptcy and 
discharge, the creditor, who has got a court judgment for the enforcement of his 
claims, will make the debtors life miserable by continuous harassment. This may 
continue forever making the debtor, restless, hopeless and unproductive. 
Individuals may also have entrepreneurship ideas that are worth putting in the 
market and credit is important tool for such startups. With credit, however, there is 
a risk. The new entrepreneurial idea may not work and may bring with it 
indebtedness, which the individual may not be able to repay even after working for 
the whole of his life.  
On the other side of the spectrum, consumer bankruptcy and fresh-start carry 
with it some costs. A system where most debtors walk-off without paying 
something significant will be a huge burden for growing economy like ours. The 
issue of financing the system is another worry. Abuse of the system can be added 
to the problems. It is, therefore, very crucial to have a consumer bankruptcy law 
where a benefits will outweigh the costs by far. Repayment plan with discharge 
and fresh start for successful debtors who will pay cost of proceeding and a certain 
portion of debt will be a good option.  
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Bankruptcy law used to be a tool for businesses for most part of its history. 
Yet it has been long ago since the same is extended to cover individuals as well. 
Several reasons accounted for this shift. At the forefront of the reasons for such 
departure includes the availability of credit and resultant over-indebtedness that 
many countries have experienced prior to the adoption of their consumer 
bankruptcy laws. Indebtedness is becoming a universal problem. Different 
jurisdictions are reacting to the problem by adopting a consumer bankruptcy law 
where by the debts of the debtor are wiped-out and the debtor starts life afresh. 
The scope of fresh discharge and fresh start varies across jurisdictions and 
some are pro-debtor with generous relief, exemptions and fresh start while others 
have provided restrictive conditions in their consumer bankruptcy laws. The 
United States and Germany can be contrasted in this regard. The former has a 
generous debt relief and discharge while the later has a series of procedures and 
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efforts that are required of the debtor to earn a fresh start. There are several reasons 
for the difference between the two countries’ laws. Availability of safety net 
programs, attitude towards entrepreneurship, economic policy, stigma towards debt 
and consumer credit are just some of the reasons.  
Currently, several countries are moving towards the adoption of consumer 
bankruptcy law. It is being justified out of several reasons and is considered as 
multi-faceted tool that serves several socio-economic functions. The issue of 
introducing the same law is under discussion in Ethiopia. A group of experts have 
made it clear that introducing such law is good for Ethiopia.
362
 I also agree that 
consumer bankruptcy law designed after the German Model will benefit Ethiopia.  
It will solve the problem of debt collection and help individuals start life anew and 
join the society as a productive member. Consumer bankruptcy will help in 
entrepreneurial development reducing the risk of investing in new ideas. It will 
also be a substitute for the lack of safety net and inadequate social security 
schemes for individuals, who cannot otherwise survive the changed circumstances 
they will face such as illness, loss of job, divorce, etc. 
 
362 See Tilahun Teshome et al, supra note 342, at 82-84. 
